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WHAT  IS THE GREATEST  EVIL?
THE  LESSER  EVIL:  POLITICAL  ETHICS  IN  AN  AGE  OF
TERROR.  By  Michael  Ignatieff.  Princeton  and  Oxford:  Princeton
University Press.  2004.  Pp. xii,  212.  $22.95  (cloth).
Reviewed by Martha Minow*
In  The  Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age  of Terror, Michael
Ignatieff asks the question that every  member of this society should be
asking since  September  i i:  how  do  we combat terrorist threats  to  our
society  without destroying the  values of our society?  We  can  put  the
question  more  formally:  how  do we  protect  our constitutional  democ-
racy  without  contravening  constitutional  and  democratic  commit-
ments?  And we  can  put the question more  personally:  how do  we en-
sure our  survival  and  make  sure  that we  are  proud  of - or  at  least
comfortable with - the we that survives?
These  are  not  academic  issues.  Images  of  prisoner  abuse  at  the
hands of American  troops  at Abu  Ghraib circulate  the  globe and sup-
ply evidence  to support  the  worst charges  of American  arrogance  and
depravity.  Thus  far, the federal judiciary  has reaffirmed  the  require-
ment of judicial review, though in the most minimal form, of long-term
detentions,'  yet the  Bush Administration continues to detain over  iooo
individuals  without  charges  in  the  United  States2  and  approximately
*  William  Henry Bloomberg  Professor of Law, Harvard Law  School.  Thanks to Yael Aridor
Bar-Ilan, Richard  Falk,  Peter Galison,  Jack Goldsmith,  Phil  Heymann,  Elena  Kagan,  Mary  Mi-
now, Joe  Singer,  and  Elizabeth  V. Spelman  for  comments  on an  earlier  draft and  further  discus-
sions about the issues addressed  here.  Thanks also to Ken  Roth for  his expert advice and to  Yael
Aridor Bar-Ilan,  Cori  Crider, Isabel  Goodman,  Samuel  Layton, Amy  Lehr, and Adel  Tamano  for
research  into cruel,  inhumane,  and degrading treatment under  international,  U.S., and compara-
tive law.
I See  Rasul v. Bush,  124  S.  Ct. 2686, 2699  (2004) (holding that any person detained in  a place
controlled  by the United  States  is  able  to invoke federal judicial  review  through  the  U.S.  habeas
statute);  Hamdi  v. Rumsfeld,  124  S.  Ct.  2633,  2648-49  (2004)  (plurality opinion) (holding  that  a
U.S.  citizen  alleged  to support  hostile  forces  must be  given  access  to  a neutral  tribunal  to  chal-
lenge  his designation  by  the executive  as an  enemy combatant and  therefore  his  detention pursu-
ant to a congressional  authorization  for the use of military force,  though  noting that, among other
things, a rebuttable  presumption  in favor  of the  government  would not violate the  Constitution).
But see id.  at  2651  (noting that a properly constituted military tribunal might satisfy due process
requirements).  Whether  aliens  are entitled  to the  same due process  protections  as  citizens in  this
context, however, remains  unclear.
2  The  actual  number of detainees held  by the United  States since  September  i i  is difficult to
verify because  the  government  has treated  this  matter  as too  sensitive  for  disclosure.  One  esti-
2134
HeinOnline -- 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2134 2004-2005BOOK REVIEW
550  people  at  Guant6.namo  Bay, Cuba.3   The  Guantdnamo  detainees
and several  hundred  others  now  released  have  reportedly  faced  physi-
cal  and  psychological  coercion  described  by  International  Red  Cross
observers  as  "tantamount  to  torture. '4   These  are  the  most  contro-
verted  antiterrorism  actions  taken  by  the  United  States  after  Septem-
ber  i i,  but  they  are  not  the  only  ones  that  raise  the  question,  what
lesser evils  may be warranted now?
It  may strike some  readers  as odd that Ignatieff  talks of antiterror-
ism  in  terms  of  evil.  The  revival  of "evil"  as  a  category  in  politics,
mate  indicates  2200  detainees  within  the United  States,  800 at Guantdnamo  Bay, and  50,000 in
Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  Law of War: Defining the Detainees, L.A. TIMES,  Nov.  21,  2004, at M2
(compiled by  Michael  Soller).  After  September  ii,  the  Department of Justice  detained hundreds
of individuals,  most of them Arab  and Muslim  men,  for an  average  of eighty days  each,  both to
pursue  information  and to  incapacitate  potential terrorists.  See  Tom  Brune,  Nominee's  Tactics
Get a New  Look: Now That Chertoff Has Been Picked To Head Homeland Security, Critics Seek
New Scrutiny of Post-9-hi  Detentions of Muslim, Arab Men, NEWSDAY,  Jan.  13,  2005,  at A2o,
LEXIS, News Library, Newsdy  File.  On November  5,  2001,  the  Department  of Justice  reported
without releasing names that it had detained  1182  individuals in connection with its September  i  i
investigation.  Neil  A.  Lewis,  Judge  Orders  U.S.  To  Release  Names  of 9/l  Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES,  Aug.  3,  2002,  at Ai.  Most  were  ultimately  released  without  charges;  some  remain de-
tained on the ostensible basis  of having violated U.S. immigration  laws.  See Brune, supra; Edito-
rial,  In Jail by  Choice: 9/il  Detainees Should Not  Be Released, S.D.  UNION-TRIB.,  Sept.  I5,
2003,  at B6, LEXIS,  News Library, Sdut File; Bob Sudyk,  Detained: Since 9-1,  the Government
Has Put Thousands of Immigrants Behind Bars, Where They Have Been Treated as if They  Were
Terrorists.  But  How  Safe  Do  We  Want  To  Be?,  HARTFORD  COURANT,  Jan.  4,  2004,  at  5,
LEXIS,  News  Library, Htcour  File.  Others  have been  deported.  See  Lyle  Denniston,  US  De-
tainees Take Case to UN Agency, BOSTON  GLOBE, Jan.  28,  2004,  at A3. An internal Justice  De-
partment  report in  2003  indicates failures  by  FBI agents to distinguish those  detainees  with con-
nections  to  terrorism  from  those  without any  such  connections.  Tom  Brune,  U.S.  Faulted on
Detainees:  Internal  Justice Report Finds Abuse, Some Held Too Long, NEWSDAY, June 3, 2003,  at
A6, LEXIS, News Library, Newsdy File.  One analyst attributes intelligence  failures in  part to the
absence  of federal agents  familiar  with the  language  and  culture  of the  primarily  immigrant de-
tainees.  See  Juliette  Kayyem,  Editorial, Changing the  Color of Intelligence, BOSTON  GLOBE,
Aug. 3, 2004, at AI 3.
3  James Risen, 35 Guantdnamo Detainees Are Given to Pakistan,  N.Y. TIMES,  Sept. 19, 2004,
§ i,  at 35. GuantAnamo Bay is an anomalous zone,  under the complete jurisdiction and control  of
the  United States, yet arguably  without the  full constitutional  protections  available on  U.S.  terri-
tory.  See Joseph Lelyveld,  "The Least Worst Place": Life in Guantdnamo,  in THE  WAR ON  OUR
FREEDOMS:  CIVIL LIBERTIES  IN  AN AGE  OF TERRORISM  Ioo (Richard C. Leone  & Greg An-
rig,  Jr. eds.,  2003);  Gerald  L.  Neuman,  Anomalous Zones,  48  STAN.  L.  REV.  1197,  1197-1201,
1228-33  (I996). In an arrangement  dating to  i9o3,  the United  States leases  the space  from Cuba
for  the  U.S.  naval  base.  See id. at  1197.  Today, according  to  an  Australian journalist,  "Guan-
tanamo is a good  place for  a military  prison  because it is so difficult to  reach.  No  unauthorised
person  can  go into the  base  via Cuban territory  and no  unauthorised person  can  land directly  on
the  base  by  sea  or  air."  Keith  Suter,  How  America  Won  Its  Cuban Terror Prison, DAILY
TELEGRAPH  (Sydney, Aus.), Dec.  7, 2004, at 47, LEXIS, News Library, Daitel  File.
4  Neil  A.  Lewis, Red  Cross President Plans Visit  to Washington  on Question of Detainees'
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  1,  2004, at A27 (quoting a report of the International  Committee  of
the Red Cross).  Despite  persistent military denials, internal  FBI communications corroborate  that
cruel interrogation  techniques  have  been  used  at GuantAnamo  Bay.  See Carol  Rosenberg, Mili-
tary Asserts Treatment at Guantanamo Is Humane, BOSTON GLOBE,  Dec.  25,  2004, at A13.
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journalism,  and  academic  study  after  September  I I  has  drawn  reli-
gious  rhetoric into once-secularized  terrain.  "Evil" comes  to character-
ize the  terrorist  threat.s  The term  casts  those  who respond  to evil  on
the side  of the  right and the  good.6   Unlike  the  public  officials  invok-
ing evil after September  I I,'  Ignatieff uses the  moral category  of "evil"
to describe  both  the  strategies  of  terrorists  and  the  many  steps that  a
democratic  nation  may  pursue  in  response.  In  The  Lesser Evil, he
writes: "Using  the  word evil rather than  the word  harm is  intended to
highlight  the  elements  of  moral  risk  that  a  liberal  theory  of govern-
ment  believes  are  intrinsic  to  the maintenance  of order  in any  society
premised upon the dignity of individuals" (p.  18).
To maintain  order  while respecting  the  dignity  of individuals  - of
all individuals - is to combine the calculus  of utility and effectiveness
with calculations  of a different sort.  For inevitably also at stake is our
character as  individuals and as a society.  What  kind of people are  we
and what kinds of values do we hold?  What should we refuse  to sacri-
fice  even if survival  is on  the line?  The acknowledgment  that evil  can
describe  not  only  terror, but also  responses  to  it stands  as  one  of the
central contributions  of Ignatieff's book.  Naming both the danger and
the  temptation  "evil"  also  demonstrates  that  the  author  is  an  honest
observer.  For  if evil  is  at work  in  the behavior  of the  terrorists,  it is
also at issue  in  the  steps  contemplated  in response.  Both  can  involve
politically motivated  violence."  Both  grow  from  fear  and hatred.  By
engaging  in  either  acts  of terrorism  or the  war  against  it, individuals
S See,  e.g.,  Ron  Rosenbaum,  Degrees of Evil: Some  Thoughts on Hitler, bin Laden, and the
Hierarchy of Wickedness, ATLANTIC  MONTHLY,  Feb. 2002,  at 63,  63-68  (comparing Hitler and
bin  Laden in  light of the concept of evil).  For an effort to trace  semiotic shifts in the characteriza-
tions  of "good"  and "bad"  after  September  ii,  see  Karen  Engle,  Constructing Good  Aliens and
Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75  U. COLO. L. REV. 59,  IOO-Io  (2004).
6 Indeed,  in  his  first  public  response  to  the  September  ii  attacks,  President  Bush  spoke  in
terms  of good  and  evil.  See President  George  W.  Bush,  Statement  by the  President  in  His Ad-
dress to the Nation  (Sept.  1I,  2001)  ("Thousands of lives  were  suddenly ended  by evil, despicable
acts  of terror....  America  has  stood down enemies  before,  and  we  will do so  this time.  None  of
us will ever forget this day.  Yet, we go forward to defend freedom  and all that is good and just in
our  world."),  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20o0oIgi-i6.html.  For  an  espe-
cially passionate  statement invoking notions of good  and evil by  a high government  official whose
wife was on  the plane  that crashed into the  Pentagon,  see  Theodore  B.  Olson,  Barbara  K. Olson
Memorial Lecture, in  6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2001).
7  Such  absolutist  responses  to  terrorism  have  been  characterized  as  constituting  American
"imperial  zealotry."  See, e.g.,  Makau  Mutua, Terrorism and Human Rights: Power Culture, and
Subordination,  8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.  1, 8 (2002).
8  See Theodore  P. Seto,  The Morality of Terrorism,  35  LOY.  L.A. L. REV. 1227,  1235-36  (2002)
(cautioning against "claiming that it  is moral for  us to kill, bomb, and maim, but not  for Al Qaeda
to do so").
2136 [V01. 118:2 134
HeinOnline -- 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2136 2004-2005BOOK REVIEW
and groups  become  willing - and  even  eager  - to  sacrifice  innocent
people abroad and at home.9
Ignatieff acknowledges  that  violence,  fear, and  hatred  plague  anti-
terrorism  efforts by  democratic societies.  He does not paper over hard
choices  and  true  dilemmas.  With  a  tragic  sensibility  honed  through
grappling  with  the  history  of  violence  and  violent  responses  to  vio-
lence,  Ignatieff  calls  upon  a practical  wisdom  that  combines  commit-
ment to principle  with an acknowledgment  that the  Constitution is not
a suicide  pact  (p.  40). 10  According  to  Ignatieff,  neither  principle  nor
necessity should trump.  We  may at times  need "to  take  actions in de-
fense  of  democracy  [that]  will  stray  from  democracy's  own  founda-
tional commitments  to dignity"  (p.  8).11  Ignatieff argues  that we  may
need  to depart - during  rigorously time-limited  emergencies  (p. 5 ')  -
from some  of our overarching  legal and  ethical commitments.  We may
at times need  to pursue "a lesser evil" to fight a greater evil. 12
As  a  result,  to  some  readers,  Ignatieff's  book  seems  to  give  the
Bush  Administration  cover  for  the  detention  of  Americans  without
trial, the  imprisonment  of non-Americans  without charges  or access  to
counsel,  the  surveillance  of  populations  without  particularized  suspi-
9  Robert Jay Lifton  goes  further and  argues that the  September  i i  attacks  generated  among
many Americans  a genuine  fear that the government  could  manipulate in  order to justify a policy
of foreign  control  and  domination,  producing an  amorphous,  grandiose, and  potentially limitless
state  of  war.  See  ROBERT  JAY  LIFTON,  SUPERPOWER  SYNDROME:  AMERICA'S
APOCALYPTIC  CONFRONTATION  WITH  THE  WORLD  9-I1  (2003).  Making  the  point more
modestly, another commentator suggests that America  risks responding to terror  with terror.  See
Christopher  L.  Blakesley, Ruminations on  Terrorism &  Anti-Terrorism Law  &  Literature,  57  U.
MIAMI  L.  REV.  1041,  1046  (2003)  (considering  this  risk  and  warning  against  potential  U.S.  re-
sponses  that could  be  labeled  "terroristic").  Quasi-religious  ideas  of expiation  and  revenge  may
also lead to sacrificing  innocents.  See  id.  at io65-68.
10  Ignatieff quotes Justice  Robert Jackson's  dissenting  opinion  in Terminiello v.  Chicago, 337
U.S.  i,  37  (I949) (Jackson,  J., dissenting).  See also Aptheker  v. Sec'y  of State,  378  U.S.  500,  509
(1964)  (quoting Kennedy  v.  Mendoza-Martinez, 372  U.S.  144,  16o (1963)).  As  Ignatieff notes  (p.
32),  President  Abraham  Lincoln, in  justifying  his  invocation  of military powers,  articulated  this
principle  in  a message  to  Congress:  "[A]re  all  the  laws,  but one,  to  go  unexecuted,  and  the  gov-
ernment  itself go  to pieces,  lest that one be violated?"  Abraham  Lincoln, Message  to Congress  in
Special Session (July 4,  1861),  in  4 THE COLLECTED  WORKS OF ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  421,  430
(Roy P. Basler ed.,  1953).
11  David Cole  explores  this issue  from a distinctively  civil libertarian perspective.  See gener-
ally David Cole,  The  New  McCarthyism: Repeating History in  the War on Terrorism, 38  HARV
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003).
12  This idea, of course,  supplies  the name for  the book  (p.  8).  Ignatieff makes  related  but dis-
tinct arguments for  the  use  of lesser  evils, including  violence,  by both  constitutional  democracies
fighting terrorists  and minority  or disempowered  groups  with grievances  against  the state.  Thus,
for the  political group pursuing violence,
[t]he evil does  not consist  in the  resort to  violence  itself, since  violence  can  be justified,
as a last resort,  in  the face  of oppression, occupation,  or injustice.  The  evil  consists  in
resorting to violence  as a first  resort, in order to make  peaceful politics  impossible, and,
second, in  targeting  unarmed  civilians  and  punishing them  for  their allegiance  or their
ethnicity. (p.  iio)
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cion,  and the argument,  unabashedly  made  by the  United  States  gov-
ernment since September  i i, that it is  not bound  by  international, do-
mestic, or military law.1 3  Because  Ignatieff contemplates  that sacrifice
of  individual  dignity  sometimes  could  be  justified  by  pursuit  of na-
tional  security - and perhaps  also  because  he supported  the  invasion
of Iraq  as  a  lesser  evil 14  - his  book  has  drawn  criticism  as  "an  ele-
gantly packaged  manual of national self-justification."' s
Ignatieff's  analysis  indeed  would  authorize  - under  special  cir-
cumstances  and  with  particularized  justifications  and  administrative
or  judicial  review  - some  departures  from  pre-existing  norms  re-
straining  government  action. 16   But  his analysis  would  also  condemn
vital aspects  of the  U.S.  response  to  September  ii. 1 7  Ignatieff  insists
that no  responses  to terror  should  be  undertaken  without  being justi-
fied, at the  time  or as  soon  as possible  thereafter, to  a  reviewing  deci-
sionmaker  and,  as  often  as  possible,  to the  people  as  a whole  (pp.  i i-
12,  24).  In  struggling  over  the  need  to  justify departures  from  legal
13 See,  e.g.,  Ronald  Steel, Fight Fire with Fire, N.Y. TIMES  BOOK REV.,  July  25,  2004,  at  13
(criticizing  Ignatieff  as  providing  a  "legalistic"  justification  for  counterterrorism  measures).
Among  other claims, the  Administration  has  asserted  that the  President's  "Commander-in-Chief
power  is at its height when  the Nation  itself comes  under attack."  Reply Brief  for the  Petitioner,
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124  S.  Ct. 2711  (2004) (No. 03-1027),  available in  2004 WL 871163,  at "13.
14  In  an earlier  book, Ignatieff defended what he  called "Empire  Lite" - a form of temporary
imperialism  that  involves  humanitarian  intervention  and  nation-building.  See  MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF,  EMPIRE  LITE:  NATION-BUILDING  IN  BOSNIA,  KOSOVO,  AND AFGHANISTAN
122-27 (2003).  Much of his argument attempted  to rationalize not only the NATO intervention  in
Kosovo  but  also  the  Afghanistan  and,  at least  implicitly, Iraq  conflicts.  Indeed,  Ignatieff  sup-
ported  the invasion  of Iraq.  As  he explained in  an interview  subsequent  to the publication of the
earlier book, he viewed  the  2003 invasion  as the  lesser evil in the face of evidence of Saddam  Hus-
sein's torture  center  and  of his  regime's  chemical  attack  on  Halabja  in  1988.  Tough  Choices in
War on  Terror, HERALD  (Glasgow),  Aug.  21,  2004,  at  7,  LEXIS,  News  Library, Gherald  File.
Still, "[elven as  he insists upon his  own good intentions with regard  to Iraq, . . .Ignatieff is clearly
uncomfortable  with  the  widespread  perception  that he  is an  apologist  for  a badly-misconceived
occupation  orchestrated  by  a vociferously  right-wing White House."  Id.  Indeed,  Ignatieff is  not
an apologist,  but rather  an original  thinker attentive  to power, security, and  the dynamics  of vio-
lence.  He  has written  insightful  books  on  cycles of revenge,  see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD
AND  BELONGING: JOURNEYS  INTO THE NEW  NATIONALISM  (Noonday  Press  I995),  and  on
social needs  and  human  rights, see MICHAEL  IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS  OF STRANGERS  (1984).
His vivid and  eloquent biography of Isaiah Berlin locates the  philosopher's skeptical and humane
liberalism  in  his  responses  to Russian  tyranny, Jewish  childhood,  and  British  education.  See
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, ISAIAH BERLIN: A LIFE (1998).  Elaborating  the themes in Berlin's  writ-
ings, Ignatieff  sympathetically  recreates  the  philosopher's  views while  presenting an  invigorating
and  human  conception  of Berlin's  commitments  to  liberty.  Currently  a professor  at  the John  F.
Kennedy  School  of Government  at  Harvard  University,  Ignatieff has  steered  its  human  rights
program  to  unique and sustained engagement  with questions  of national  security and  the  geopo-
litical instability exacerbated  by failed states.
15  Steel, supra note 13.
16  See infra Part II,  pp. 2151-56.
17 See infra Part I, pp.  2143-51  (applying Ignatieff's  analysis to  features  of the U.S.  response
to September  i i).
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as a guard against greater evil.
The central difficulty - for Ignatieff and for us all - is that "[e]vil
is  obvious  only  in  retrospect.' 8  Indeed,  "[e]vil  when  we  are  in  its
power is  not felt  as evil but as  a necessity, or even  as a duty."'19  Even
more  difficult  than determining  what is  a lesser  and what is a greater
evil  is discerning  how to proceed  in the  knowledge  that the truth can-
not  be known.  In fact, the  truth  will be  distorted  by  felt necessity  in
the  moment  of perceived  danger.  The  internment  of Japanese  resi-
dents of the United States and Japanese-American  citizens, as Ignatieff
recognizes  (p.  75),  should  serve  as  a constant  reminder  of such distor-
tions  produced  by  the  sense  of necessity.
20  During  World  War  II,  in
the  grip of a felt emergency, and with general  acclaim  from a  majority
of the  American  population,  officials  forcibly  evacuated  and incarcer-
ated  120,000  lawful  residents  and  actual  U.S.  citizens  simply  because
they  were  of Japanese  ancestry.2 1  The  government  confiscated  their
businesses  and homes and  forced sales for a pittance  on  the basis of no
particular  evidence.2 2  Deferring  to  military  and executive  judgment,
the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  convictions  in the  name  of necessity.23
Propelled  by  a  sense  of  necessity,  and  seeking  deference  from  the
courts, the  officials misrepresented  the state of the evidence.  It  was for
that  wrongdoing  that  forty  years  later  a  district  court  vacated  the
convictions.
2 4
18  GLORIA STEINEM, If  Hitler Were Alive,  Whose Side Would He Be On?, in  OUTRAGEOUS
ACTS  AND  EVERYDAY  REBELLIONS  332,  346  (2d ed.  1995).  This  may  be  an  overstatement;
some evil may be  obvious at the first moment it rears its head.  Nonetheless, there is an important
insight  here:  while  caught  in  the  grip  of felt  necessity, people  often  commit acts  that  appear  to
others - and even  later to  themselves  - as truly  evil.  At the  moment of action,  few  evildoers
think of themselves  as such.  Instead, they usually have  a surfeit of justification and  some confi-
dence  in their own judgment.  Trusting  the judgment of those acting in  the moment, thus, simply
cannot prevent  evil.
19  SIMONE WEIL, GRAVITY  AND GRACE  121  (195 2).
20  Rather than emphasizing the distortions induced  by a sense  of necessity and  panic, Ignatieff
turns  to  the  Japanese-American  evacuation  and  internment  to  illustrate  that his  lesser-evil  ap-
proach  would "put far more emphasis than a  pragmatic  one on the  loss entailed in  the abridgment
of  the  rights  of the  Japanese"  (p.  35).  Someone  using  the  lesser-evil  approach  would  consider
claims  that  the  internment  would  shorten  the  war,  but  would  assess  the  uncertainty  of those
claims  and therefore  find curtailment  of civil liberties unjustifiable,  especially given  a prior com-
mitment to  the view that  abridging civil  liberties is an evil  (p. 36).  For a searing narrative  about
how  natural  the  internment  of  Japanese  Americans  seemed  to  whites,  see  ELLA  LEFFLAND,
RUMORS OF PEACE (1979Y
21  PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR vii (1983).
22  See  YASUKO  I.  TAKEZAWA,  BREAKING  THE  SILENCE:  REDRESS  AND  JAPANESE
AMERICAN ETHNICITY  30-31  (995).
23  See Korematsu  v. United States, 323  U.S. 214,  219 (I944).
24  Korematsu  v.  United States,  584  F. Supp.  14o6,  1416-19  (N.D. Cal.  1984).  For the  argu-
ments  pressed  in  favor of vacating  the convictions,  see Petition  for Writ of Error  Coram  Nobis,
Korematsu,  584  F.  Supp.  14o6  (No.  CR-27635  W),  reprinted in  JUSTICE  DELAYED:  THE
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If this  dark  episode  teaches  us  anything,  it  is  that  we  should  be
skeptical  about claims  of necessity  in wartime.  Our skepticism  should
prompt us  to  review  policies  adopted  in  the wake  of a  felt emergency
and  cast  out  those  enacted  in  error.  Courts,  legislatures,  media,  and
citizens  must  undertake  independent  scrutiny  of  restrictions  on  civil
liberties  adopted  during  times of national  crisis. 2 5  Even if official  re-
view is  initially  withheld  from the  public  - or occurs  in public  view
years  after the  events  - knowledge  that judicial,  legislative,  and jour-
nalistic  review  will  occur  may  serve  to  deter  misconduct.  It  also  af-
fords  the  occasion for  public learning  about misconduct.  Learning  af-
ter  the  fact  of  impropriety  may  lead  to  decisions  to  punish  the
wrongdoing  or  to  take  steps  to  prevent  its  recurrence.  The commit-
ment  to  maintaining  review  reflects  and,  in  turn,  keeps  alive  skepti-
cism  about  assertions  by  officials  that they  need  power  and  need  not
justify its exercise.  But it is skepticism,  not disbelief, that must be  cul-
tivated.  The goal is to proceed  with skepticism  and restraint  when  we
know  for  certain that we  do not know  enough  and that our judgment
is  skewed  by fear.  The  challenge,  then,  is  to  devise  reliable  rules  and
institutions  - and  to cultivate  the  character  of both  leaders  and  the
people  whom they serve.
At its best, Ignatieff's  book faces  this challenge  squarely.  Ignatieff
articulates specific  questions and methods that a constitutional  democ-
racy should use  to assess and  reassess exigent  measures that violate in-
dividual  dignity.  He calls  for precommitment  strategies  to  respect the
rights  of  individuals  because  even  democratic  states  are  "sorely
tempted to abridge  them  in times of danger"  (p. 3 i).26  He deems blan-
RECORD OF THE JAPANESE  AMERICAN  INTERNMENT  CASES  125-88 (Peter Irons ed.,  1989).
For a description  of the Korematsu incident  more  generally,  see JACOBUS  TENBROEK  ET  AL.,
PREJUDICE, WAR  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION  (1954).  The  Court  did  not  wait forty  years  to
reach  the  conclusion  that the  government  lacked  the  authority  to  detain  an individual  already
cleared  of  any suspicion  of disloyalty.  See Ex Parte Endo,  323  U.S.  283,  302-04  (1944).  For  a
thoughtful argument  that this  decision  - resting ostensibly  on  a construction  of the  governing
regulations and statute  - should  be remembered as much  as Korematsu, see Patrick 0.  Gudridge,
Remember Endo?, i16 HARV. L. REV.  1933  (2003).
25  See Susan  Kiyomi  Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu  v. United  States: A  "Constant Cau-
tion" in  a  Time  of Crisis, io  ASIAN  L.J.  37,  49-50  (2003)  (treating Korematsu as a  lesson  about
"[t]he need  for continuing political activism and constant vigilance to protect our civil rights").
26  The  courts  have  long treated  the  Bill of Rights  as a precommitment  mechanism.  See, e.g.,
Ullmann  v. United  States, 350  U.S.  422, 428  (1956) ("No doubt  the constitutional privilege may, on
occasion,  save  a guilty  man from his  just deserts.  It  was aimed  at a more  far-reaching  evil - a
recurrence  of the  Inquisition and  the  Star Chamber, even  if not  in their stark  brutality.  Preven-
tion of the greater  evil was deemed of more importance  than occurrence  of the lesser evil.  Having
had much  experience  with  a tendency in  human  nature to abuse  power,  the  Founders  sought to
close the doors against like future  abuses by law-enforcing agencies.").  Ignatieff's arguments  rein-
force  the  importance of articulating in  moments of perceived  emergency  precommitments  to  pro-
cedures  and  structures  to  monitor  decisions  and  promote  democratic  accountability,  as  well  as
precommitments  to individual  rights.  For  additional  work on  this terrain,  see Bruce Ackerman,
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ket  detentions  and  broad  roundups  of  suspects  always  mistaken  be-
cause  they violate  individual  rights and depend  on the erroneous  view
of guilt by association  (p. io).  He insists on  administrative,  legislative,
or  judicial  review,  in  camera  if  necessary  to  enable  effective  intelli-
gence  gathering,  but  review  nonetheless  (pp.  24,  134)37  And he  calls
for  vigorous  reconsideration  of extreme  governmental  power  author-
ized during  emergencies  (pp.  39-40).  Otherwise,  a strategy  of "better
safe than  sorry" will drive  responses to all threats and will  risk leaving
statutory  authorization  for  extraordinary  governmental  powers  on  the
books long after those threats have passed (p. 8o).
For Ignatieff, potential  abuses can best be deterred, and the faith  of
citizens  best  earned  and  renewed,  by  adversarial  justification  before
formal  institutions  and  the  public  (pp.  50,  168-70).  Mindful  that  a
ruthless  government  can  shape  perceptions  and  manufacture  consent,
Ignatieff rests his hope  particularly on "the  intransigent courage of the
few"  who would defend rights threatened  in an  emergency  (pp. 52-53).
Perhaps  too  optimistically,  he  expresses  faith  that  agents  of  a  liberal
democratic  state can  "hold the  line  that ...  separates  targeted  assassi-
nation  of enemy  combatants  from  assassinations  that entail  the death
of  innocent  civilians"  (p.  1 18).28  To  his  credit,  Ignatieff  continually
emphasizes  the morally problematic  nature  of any sacrifice  of individ-
ual  liberty  in  the  name  of enhanced  security, and  this  attention  is  the
primary  contribution  of  The  Lesser Evil.  Ignatieff  reminds  us  that
such  a  sacrifice,  even  when  justifiable,  produces  a  moral  remainder,
taxing  the  character  of society  and demanding  amends  (p.  18).  These
issues must come  into sharp  focus now, as some  provisions  of the  2001
USA  PATRIOT  Act 29  (the  Patriot  Act) reach  sunset  - and  opportu-
nity for renewal - this year.30
The  Emergency Constitution, 113  YALE  L.J.  1029  (2004);  and  Laurence  H.  Tribe  &  Patrick  0.
Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, i  13 YALE L.J. s8oi (2004).
27  Ignatieff  may  have  too  hopeful  a  view  about the  independent  check  judicial  review  pro-
vides.  Like  the Korematsu Court,  courts today easily  defer to government  claims  of necessity  in
the war on  terror.  For example,  a federal  court of appeals  concluded  that the  Bush Administra-
tion could  conceal  the  identities of  the  hundreds  of people  it  detained  after  September  ii.  See
Ctr. for Nat'l  Sec.  Studies  v. United  States Dep't of Justice,  331  F.3 d 918,  937 (D.C.  Cir. 2003).
Another  federal court, however,  rejected the government's  blanket closure  of deportation hearings
after September  ii.  See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303  F.3d 68i, 7 Io-Ii (6th Cir. 20o2).
28  The  book  also explores the  dynamics  of terrorism, especially given  the  legitimacy  of some
motivating  grievances (p. 86) and the psychology  of terror and nihilism (pp. 121-32),  including the
cult of sacrifice  that interferes  with  people's  capacities  to question  or respond  rationally to  coun-
terterrorism  measures (pp.  15  -5  ).
29  Uniting and  Strengthening  America  by  Providing Appropriate  Tools Required  to Intercept
and  Obstruct  Terrorism  Act (USA  PATRIOT  Act) of  2001,  Pub.  L.  No.  107-56,  iiS  Stat.  272
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
30  See  id.  § 224(a) (codified  at i8  U.S.C.A.  § 251o  note  (West 2000  &  Supp.  2004)).  Although
the  statute exempts  many  of its features from  this sunset  provision, see  id.  §  224, nothing  would
prevent  Congress  from reconsidering  any and all  portions  of the Patriot  Act if it considers  renew-
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Reviewing  historical  examples,  Ignatieff's  book  nonetheless  is  pri-
marily a general work of ethical reflection.  It  leaves to others the tasks
of applying  its advice  to our  current  situation  and  of testing  that ad-
vice.  I take these  up as my  tasks  here in hopes  of spurring  more con-
crete discussion  in the exact spirit that Ignatieff enacts:  sober, realistic,
and mindful of tragic  choices.  It  is striking,  if easy, to see  how  much
of  the  Bush  Administration's  response  to  September  i i  fails  even  in
this  context.31  The  defects  of U.S.  practices  after  September  ii  are
exposed  by Ignatieff's  tests for justifiable  lesser  evils and are the  focus
of the first Part of this  Review,  which  should  put to  rest  the  incorrect
perception  that Ignatieff's  book  offers  an  intellectual  apology  for  the
practices  of  the  Bush Administration.  I then  look at those departures
from  traditional  protections  of individual  rights  that,  even  in  light  of
their jeopardy to national morality, Ignatieff  believes would  satisfy the
precommitments  he  articulates.  Here,  I  raise  some  questions  about
whether  Ignatieff properly  applies  his own  criteria and  about whether
the  criteria  require more  specificity  if they are to fulfill  their purposes.
What remains after this analysis are substantial areas  where we cannot
tell  what  precisely  is  prohibited  by  Ignatieff's  guides  - which  unfor-
tunately  means  we  cannot tell  in crucial  moments  what we  should do.
Thus,  the  final  Part of  the  Review  turns  to  specific  steps  to  combat
terrorism  that could  be  pursued  both  to  test the  guides  offered in  The
Lesser Evil and to  consider  what  roles  law, democracy,  and  our own
individual  choices  should  play  if  ethical  imperatives  are  to  receive
their due.
Like  Ignatieff, I take the  traditional  due  process  our  constitutional
democracy  affords  its domestic citizens  as the baseline  for assessing the
steps  proposed  to  fight  terrorism.  Some  resist  this  assumption  and
posit that September  i i  put the  country on a new course.  Thus, some
scholars  push  for  new  constitutional  practices  designed  for  an  emer-
gency;32  others argue  specifically  for deference  to the executive  branch
ing  those  provisions  that do  face  expiration at the  end of 2005.  The opportunity  to review  criti-
cally the  existing antiterrorist measures is  especially  vital  given that terrorism  will probably per-
sist longer than "we can  safely suspend democratic freedoms or our  traditional separation  of pow-
ers."  PHILIP  B.  HEYMANN,  TERRORISM,  FREEDOM  AND SECURITY:  WINNING  WITHOUT
WAR  179  (2003).
31  Essentially, the current Administration's  response  to terrorism  largely  fails  Ignatieff's pru-
dential  tests  of necessity, effectiveness, and  last  resort.  See  infra Part I, pp.  2 143-5 I.  It  poten-
tially complies  with his demand  for open and  adversarial  review - if the  availability of Supreme
Court consideration  of administrative  refusals of process and disclosure  counts.  See infra Part 11,
pp. 2,51-56.  But it substantially breaches  respect for human  dignity, the value  that requires  even
greater vigilance than Ignatieff suggests.  See infra Part III, pp.  2156-65.
32  See Ackerman,  supra note  26.  For engaged  debate,  see David Cole,  The Priority  of Moral-
ity: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot,  113 YALE L.J.  1753  (2004);  and Tribe  & Gudridge,
supra note  26.  For a response  to the debate  he launched,  see Bruce Ackerman,  This Is  Not  War,
113  YALE L.J.  1871  (2004).  Kathleen  Sullivan  advanced an earlier defense  of the  resources within
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due  to  the  congressional  authorization  of force.33  If  only  to  be  com-
pletely  frank about precisely  what sacrifices  of liberty and  democracy
are  at stake, I  use Americans'  longstanding  rights and freedoms  as the
baseline  for all who are  subject to our nation's antiterrorism  measures,
for  these  rights  and  freedoms  are  what  we  jeopardize  when  we  con-
sider which lesser evils are justifiable.3 4
I.  WHAT FAILS THE PRECOMMITMENTS?
Ignatieff  proposes  six  tests  for  policymakers  considering  coercive
measures to fight terrorists (pp. 23-24):
35
(i)  Do  the  measures  sufficiently  respect  human  dignity  so  as  to
avoid  cruel and unusual punishment, torture, penal  servitude, extraju-
dicial execution,  or rendition of suspects to rights-abusing  countries  -
each of which is flatly unacceptable?;
(2)  Are  departures  from  prevailing  due  process  standards  "really
necessary"  and are they contained  so  that they are the  least restrictive
necessary?  (p. 24);
(3) Are  the  measures  truly  going  to be  effective  - with  effective-
ness  defined  to encompass  both short- and long-term  effects,  including
political consequences?;
(4)  Are  the  measures  truly  the  last  resort?  "[H]ave  less  coercive
measures been  tried and failed?"  (p. 24);
(5) Will open  and adversarial  legislative  and judicial  review follow
the action  immediately or soon thereafter?;  and
(6) Does the  nation attend to its international  obligations  and to the
opinions  of allies?
the  U.S.  Constitution  for  addressing the  emergency  posed  by terrorism  in  War, Peace,  and Civil
Liberties, Tanner Lectures at Harvard University (Nov. 8-9,  2OO1).  For further recent considera-
tion of how  the law should  work when  faced  with an emergency  like the  threat of terrorism,  see
ERIC  A.  POSNER & ADRIAN  VERMEULE,  ACCOMMODATING  EMERGENCIES (Chi. Pub. L.  &
Legal Theory, Working  Paper  No.  48,  2003),  at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=441343;  Oren  Gross,
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to  Violent Crises Always  Be Constitutional?,  112  YALE  L.J.
1o1  (2003);  Geoffrey  R.  Stone,  War Fever, 69  MO.  L. REV.  1131  (2004);  and  Laurence  H.  Tribe,
Supreme Constraint,  WALL  ST. J., July i,  2004, at AI 4.
33  See  Curtis  A.  Bradley  & Jack L.  Goldsmith,  Congressional  Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, i  8 HARV.  L. REV. 2047,  2054,  2056,  2078 (2005).
34  For  a remarkably  direct  and  insightful  analysis  by  a sitting judge  of  struggles  over  what
rights to  sacrifice and  what rights to save in a democracy  that is neither  at war nor not at war, see
Aharon  Barak,  The  Supreme Court, 2001  Term-Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role  of a
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV.  16 (2002).
35  The tests bear an intriguing resemblance  to - and yet are not reducible  to - U.S.  constitu-
tional  law, especially  in  their  implicit  commitment  to  restraining  state  action  according  to due
process,  compelling state  interests,  and least  restrictive  means.  Yet  Ignatieff's  tests also  include
practical  attention  to  short-  and  long-term  effectiveness,  in  terms  of both  security  and  political
effects,  and respect for both existing international legal obligations and  the opinions of allies.
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Ignatieff's  proposals,  judicious  and  sober  as  they  are,  require
greater  concreteness  both  to assess  where  they  bite  and to  press them
into  actual  service.  For example,  Ignatieff asserts  that  incursions  on
individual  rights  always  need  democratic  processes  - including
prompt  public  justification  (p.  io) - but  does  not  specify  when  or
where.  Yet  precisely  such  details  would  reveal  the feasibility  and ef-
fectiveness  of the  demand  for  full  and  public  justification;  these  fea-
tures are essential both to evaluating  and to implementing  the idea.
One  obvious  context  for the  tests of The Lesser Evil is  the current
U.S.  response  to  terrorism.  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  Ignatieff's
tests  condemn  its  general  tenor.  A  probing  review  by long-time  legal
journalist Anthony Lewis  juxtaposes  arguments  from  The Lesser Evil
with  the  general  approach  taken  by the  Bush  Administration  and  ex-
poses  how  sharply  the  Administration's  acts  diverge  from  Ignatieff's
view. 36  While  Ignatieff  insists  upon  acknowledging  and  questioning
the  incursions  on rights posed by security  measures, the Bush  Admini-
stration  treats  questions  about  its  policies  as  unpatriotic  support  for
the  terrorists.  While  Ignatieff elevates judicial  review and  counsel  for
detainees  to  the  status  of  indispensability,  the  Bush  Administration
tries  to  prevent  access  to  counsel  and  to  courts  for those  accused  who
have connections  to al Qaeda.  And while Ignatieff presses  for as much
transparency  as possible, the current government operates with  secrecy
about  the identities  and numbers  of detainees.  Ignatieff's  tests would
condemn  the  government's  secrecy,  its  confident  obliviousness  to  the
moral  consequences  of  its  acts,  and  its  treatment  of  our  liberties  as
weaknesses  to be cast off rather than commitments to be cherished.37
Many specific features of the current U.S. response to September  i i
- including  broader  government  access  to  information,  detention  of
immigrants, and resort to military commissions - fail Ignatieff's  tests.
I will consider  three  in turn.
A.  Production of Business Records
Section  215  of  the Patriot  Act  broadens  the  scope  of court  orders
for  the  production  of business  records  under  the  Foreign  Intelligence
Surveillance  Act 38  (FISA).  The  business  records  provision  was  previ-
ously  limited  to  "a  common  carrier,  public  accommodation  facility,
physical  storage  facility or vehicle  facility, '39 but now  reaches  any  en-
tity  requiring  access  to "any  tangible  things" - defined as "books,  re-
cords, papers,  documents,  and other  items" - so long  as the materials
36  Anthony Lewis, Bush and the Lesser Evil, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,  May  27,  2004,  at 9, 9-io.
37 See id.
38  5o U.S.C.A.  §  i861 (West Supp.  2004).
39  50 U.S.C.  §  1862(a) (2000).
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are  part  of  a  duly  authorized  investigation  to  obtain  foreign  intelli-
gence  information. 4 0  The prior  version  of the statute  was limited  only
to  "records"  and  required  a  showing  that  the  information  was  con-
nected to a foreign  power or one of its agents.4 1  Under the Patriot Act,
however,  court orders  can  be  used,  for  example,  to  give  the  govern-
ment  access  to  library  and  bookseller  records  - apparently  to  track
what sources  particular  patrons  use - without any prior allegation  by
the government  of specific  facts justifying the  order, so long as  the  in-
vestigation  is  said  to  protect  against  international  terrorism  or  to  aid
clandestine  intelligence  activities. 42  Although  FISA  may  not  be  used
to investigate  a U.S.  person if the  investigation  is conducted  solely  on
activities  protected  by  the  First Amendment,43  libraries  can  be  com-
pelled  to  turn  over  material  following  sealed  proceedings  before  a  se-
cret  court that issues  orders  that do  not state their  purpose.44   The  li-
brarians  are  required  to  keep  such  requests  secret.  The  potential
chilling effect of such  government power on the pursuit of information
by library  patrons,  in addition  to the  invasions of  privacy  and denials
of due  process  represented  by these  procedures,  has generated  objec-
40  See  50  U.S.C.A.  § i86I(a)(i)  (emphasis  added);  see  also Kathryn  Martin,  Note,  The  USA
Patriot  Act's Application to Library Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS.  283,  287  (2003) (discussing sec-
tion 2 15  of the Patriot Act).
41  See 5o  U.S.C. § 1862.
42  The Patriot Act authorizes the  Federal  Burea  of Investigation  to use a less-than-probable-
cause standard for investigations in  which "a significant purpose"  is foreign  intelligence  gathering
or investigating terrorism.  USA  PATRIOT  Act of 2001,  Pub. L. No.  107-56,  § 218,  115  Stat. 272,
291  (internal quotation  marks omitted) (amending 50 U.S.C.  §§  18o4(a)(7)(B),  1823(a)(7)(B)  (2000)).
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele thinks  that none of the provisions  of the  Patriot Act poses as great
a threat to civil liberties as the recently announced Attorney General  Guidelines governing  foreign
intelligence  searches,  which allow  searches  under  a very low  standard of evidence  when  foreign
intelligence  collection  is  merely  a  significant  purpose  of  the  investigation,  even  though  such
searches can also sweep in  information about citizens.  See Kim Lane Scheppele,  Law in a Time  of
Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/i, 6  U. PA. J.  CONST. L. 1001,  1041-44
(2004).  The  Attorney  General  Guidelines  obviously  work  in  tandem  with  the  Patriot  Act  and
FISA to enlarge federal investigatory powers.  Scheppele  also argues  more generally that contrary
to a sensible  response to a crisis, the Bush Administration  has continued to expand powers as time
passes rather than to contract them after an initial set of emergency responses.  Id. at 1039.
The Patriot Act's  authorization  of "sneak-and-peek"  warrants  - allowing  for delayed  noti-
fication  to the  subject - also  seems to violate  the Fourth  Amendment and  the Federal  Rules  of
Criminal  Procedure  absent a strong demonstration  of need,  at least for the  broad scope  permitted.
See USA  PATRIOT  Act  of 2001  § 213 (amending  18  U.S.C.  § 3I03a  (2000)) (authorizing delayed
notification  to  a  person  subject  to an  electronic  communications  search  if  the  government  can
show  that  giving immediate  notice  would  (i)  endanger  an  individual's  physical safety;  (2) cause
someone  to  flee  prosecution;  (3) cause evidence  to  be tampered  with;  (4)  create  potential  for  wit-
ness intimidation; or (5) jeopardize  the investigation  or unduly delay trial).  A  federal district court
found that national security letters  used  by the  FBI as  a secret administrative  subpoena  violated
the Fourth Amendment.  See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp.  2d 471,  526 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
43  50  U.S.C.A. § 186i(a)(i).
44  See MARY  MINoW,  LIBRARY  RECORDS POST-PATRIOT  ACT (FEDERAL  LAW) (Sept. 16,
2002), at http://www.llrx.com/features/libraryrecords.htm.
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tions  by  librarians  and  civil  libertarians45   Under  pressure  from  li-
brarians,  Attorney  General  John  Ashcroft  declassified  secret  informa-
tion  about  the  use  of section  215  and  disclosed  that  as of September
2003,  it had not been  used  at  all.46  Even  still,  the  Bush  Administra-
tion  halted  a bipartisan  effort  in  the  House  of  Representatives  to  ex-
empt libraries from this provision.47
Assuming  that Ashcroft  truthfully  reported  that  the  provision  has
not been  used, both  its adoption  and  retention  fail  Ignatieff's  require-
ment  that departures  from  due  process  be  "really  necessary"  and  be
contained  to  the least restrictive  necessary  (p.  24).  Nor  is section  2 ,5
"truly  the  last resort"  (p.  24)  vis-h-vis  less  coercive  measures  already
tried without success.  Unlike  the Patriot Act, Britain's Anti-Terrorism
Act  exempts  library  records  from  the  business  records  that  can  be
searched  with  relative  ease.  Under  British law, the  government  must
convince  a judge  that the information  pursued by a  search "adds sub-
stantial value  to the investigation  of a serious offense,  that other meth-
ods of obtaining access  to the  material  would clearly not  succeed,  and
that  the  search  is  in  the  public  interest  and  outweighs  any  harm  to
confidential  relationships. '48   The  United  States  should  learn  from
Britain's  rule  favoring  individualized  scrutiny  that  the  government
should adopt a more deferential rule only as a last resort.  The contrast
between  the  U.S.  rule and the  British  practice  indicates  that a less re-
strictive measure  could be quite adequate.  This conclusion  is made all
the more  poignant  by the  fact that the  Bush Administration  stands  by
this provision despite claiming that it has never been invoked.
B.  Detention of Immigrants
The  Patriot  Act  allows  the  government  to  detain  an  immigrant
suspected of terrorist activities for  up to seven days  and additional  re-
newable  six-month  periods  if  the  alien's  release  would  "threaten  the
national  security  of the  United  States  or the  safety  of the  community
45  The Campaign  for  Reader Privacy collected  and delivered to  Congress over 200,000  signa-
tures from libraries,  booksellers, publishers,  and writers  on a petition to amend section  215  of the
Patriot Act.  See http://www.readerprivacy.com  (last visited Apr.  10,  2005).  Then-Attorney  Gen-
eral John  Ashcroft, "departing  from  his  usual remarks,"  "mocked  and  condemned  the  American
Library Association  and  other  Justice  Department  critics  for  believing  that  the  F.B.I.  wants to
know 'how  far you have gotten on the latest Tom Clancy novel."'  Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Mocks
Librarians and Others Who Oppose Parts of Counterterrorism  Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.  16,  2003,
at A2 3; see  also Shannon  McCaffrey, Ashcroft  Castigates  Judges on  War Powers, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 13,  2004, at A6.
46  Dan Eggen, Ashcroft: Patriot  Act Provision Unused, WASH. POST, Sept.  18,  2003, at A13.
47  See  Bob  Hoover, Chalk  Up  One  Victory for Freedom  To  Publish, PITTSBURGH  POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 26,  2004, at J 4 .
48  Martin, supra note 40, at 304.
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or any  person. '49   This  provision amounts  to  the  power  of indefinite
detention.50  It  departs  from  the  Supreme  Court's articulation  of due
process  requirements  for  the  treatment of  immigrants  in  its  failure  to
specify  the  burden  of proof,  its extreme  grant  of executive  authority,
and  its effect of permitting indefinite  detentions.5'  Hundreds  of immi-
grants  detained  after September  i i  spent an average  of eighty  days  in
detention.
5 2  Detained at undisclosed locations  for undisclosed  reasons,
the immigrants  faced either secret hearings  or no hearings at all until a
federal judge  stepped in.53  In  addition,  the Department of Justice In-
spector  General  documented  patterns  of physical  and verbal  abuse  of
detained  immigrants by federal  guards, as  well  as the  failure to distin-
guish those presenting terrorist threats from others.
5 4
Although  the  government  has backpedaled  from these  initial prac-
tices,  much  remains  in  place  that  fails  Ignatieff's  tests.  The  Depart-
ment  of  Homeland  Security,  newly  in  charge  of  immigration,  has
pledged  to clarify what counts as  an emergency, set up periodic  review
to  ensure  greater  protections,  and  restrict  the  use  of detention  while
pursuing security.55  Judicial and administrative reviews  have reined  in
the  practices  and demonstrated  that the  prior broad  measures  are  not
now warranted.56  But the statutory authority  for broad and secret de-
49  See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,  Pub. L. No.  107-56,  §  412,  I15 Stat. 272,  350, 351-52  (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C.A. § i226a(aX6) (West Supp.  2004)).
50  See Christopher  E. Smith,  The  Bill of Rights after September nith: Principles or Pragma-
tism?, 42  DUQ. L. REV. 259,  273-79  (2004);  Jonathan Grebinar, Comment, Responding to  Terror-
ism: How Must a Democracy Do It? A  Comparison of Israeli and American Law, 31  FORDHAM
URB.  L.J. 261,  279  (2oo3).  Indefinite detention  of an immigrant is especially  excessive  when  the
government has the  authority and ability to deport the individual.
51  See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533  U.S. 678,  690-701  (2oot) (finding indefinite  detentions  of immi-
grants to  be constitutionally problematic,  especially when the immigrants  have not yet entered the
country and when it is not clear that Congress intended to authorize indefinite detentions).
52  See  Ricardo  Alonso-Zaldivar,  U.S.  Restricts Indefinite Detention  of Immigrants,  CHI.
TRIB.,  Apr. 14,  2004, § i,  at i.
53  See  Christopher  Edley, Jr.,  Editorial,  A  U.S.  Watchdog for Civil Liberties, WASH.  POST,
July  14,  2002,  at B7;  David  Sarasohn, Justice Dept. Ideas Thrown Out of Court, OREGONIAN
(Portland), June 5, 2002,  at BII, LEXIS, News Library, Oregnn File.
54  Paul  von  Zielbauer, Detainees'  Abuse Is Detailed, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  19,  2003,  at A32;  see
also Bob Herbert, Ashcroft's Quiet Prisoner,  N.Y. TIMES, Aug.  13,  2004, at As  .
55  See  Eric Lipton,  Homeland Security Chief To  Shift from  "Sky  is Falling"  Approach, N.Y.
TIMES,  Mar. 17,  2005, at A2 i.  When Judge Michael Chertoff replaced  Tom Ridge as head of the
Department  of Homeland Security, he indicated  a commitment to respect civil liberties as well as
national  security.  Washington in Brief: Senate Confirms Chertoff as Homeland Security Chief,
WASH.  POST,  Feb.  16,  2oo5,  at  A5.  Yet  critics  note  that  Chertoff  previously  authorized  the
roundup of immigrants after September  i i  and was involved  in the legal consideration of coercive
interrogation  techniques.  See, e.g.,  Helen Thomas, Editorial, Good Reason To Fret About Gonza-
les, Chertoff, Others, HOUSTON CHRON.,  Feb. 6,  2005,  at 3,  LEXIS, News Library, Hchrn File.
56  In  a  related  context,  the  Supreme Court  required  stiffer  procedural  protections  for  immi-
grants  detained  by the  Department  of Homeland  Security than  those  that the  government  pro-
posed.  See Clark v. Martinez,  125  S.  Ct. 716,  727  (2005).  Great Britain's  House of Lords ruled
that indefinite detention  of foreigners  suspected of, but not yet charged  with, terrorism is unjusti-
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tention  remains  on  the  books,  in  clear  violation  of Ignatieff's  "really
necessary"  and  "least  restrictive  possible"  requirements. 57  More  spe-
cifically, the  government  cannot  satisfy the  demand  of using the  least
restrictive  means  necessary  simply  by  announcing  that  it  needs  the
power  to  detain  indefinitely  anyone  it secretly  deems,  without  adver-
sarial process  or review, a danger.
C.  Use of Military Commissions
The  Bush  Administration  has  indefinitely  detained  suspected  ter-
rorists  and  has  further  argued  that  the  federal  courts  should  abstain
from hearing cases brought on behalf of detainees  at Guantdnamo Bay.
Instead,  the  government  planned  to  use  newly  created  military  com-
missions,  which  comply  neither  with  the  Geneva  Conventions5 s  nor
the  Uniform  Code  of Military  Justice,59  to  try detainees  or adjudicate
their  claims.60  Rebuffed  in June  2004  in  the  case  of Hamdi v. Rums-
fiable.  See  Lizette  Alvarez, British Court Says Detentions Violate Rights, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  I7,
2004, at Ai.  For a comparison  of British  and  U.S. detention  policies after  September  ii,  see  Al-
exandra Chirinos,  Finding the  Balance  Between  Liberty and  Security:  Legal Issues  Surrounding
the Detention  of Terrorist  Subjects  (2004) (unpublished LL.M. thesis,  Queen's  University of Bel-
fast)  (on  file  with  the  Harvard  Law  School  Library)  (editorial  version  forthcoming  i8  HARV.
HUM.  RTS.  J.  (Apr. 2005)).  The  seeming legitimacy of the  detentions  may  stem  in  part from  ef-
forts  to distinguish "good" and "bad" Muslims.  See Engle, supra note 5.
57  Ignatieff specifically  calls for judicial review of all detentions (p.  29).
58  Geneva  Convention  Relative  to  the  Treatment  of Prisoners  of War  of  August  12,  1949,
opened for signature Aug.  12,  1949,  6  U.S.T.  3316,  75  U.N.T.S.  135  [hereinafter  Third  Geneva
Convention].
59  5o U.S.C.A.  §§ 8oi-946 (West  I998 & Supp. 2004).
60  Citing his authority  as President  and  as Commander-in-Chief  of the  Armed  Forces  of the
United States under the Constitution, and  citing the laws of the United States of America,  includ-
ing the Authorization  for  Use of Military Force, Pub.  L.  No. 107-40,  II5  Stat. 224  (2001)  (codified
at 50  U.S.C.A.  §  1541  note  (West Supp.  2004)), and  sections  821  and  836  of io  U.S.C., President
Bush  issued  a  military  order  establishing  military  commissions  that have  exclusive  jurisdiction
over  noncitizens suspected  of being  or harboring  al Qaeda members  or of engaging,  assisting,  or
conspiring in "acts  of international terrorism  ...  or acts...  that have caused, threaten to cause, or
have  as their  aim  to  cause,  injury to or  adverse effects  on  the  United States  [or]  its citizens,  na-
tional security,  foreign  policy,  or  economy."  Military  Order  of November  13,  2ooI:  Detention,
Treatment, and  Trial  of Certain  Non-Citizens  in  the  War  Against Terrorism,  3  C.F.R.  918,  919
(2001),  reprinted in  io  U.S.C.A.  §  8o.  The  military  commissions  may convict and  sentence  by
super-majority, rather  than unanimous, vote  of judges appointed by the Secretary  of Defense.  See
id.  at § 4(c)(6)-(7).
Confusion  and  delays  surrounding  the  military  commissions  apparently  produced  disputes
within  the  Bush  Administration.  See  Tim  Golden,  Administration Officials  Split over Stalled
Military Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  25,  2004,  at Ai.  Between  2002  and  mid-2004 , most of the
detainees not charged  with war crimes  received no information  about the grounds  for their deten-
tion,  lacked  access  to  counsel  or  anyone  outside  Guantdnamo,  and  had  no  chance  to  challenge
their  status as  "enemy combatants,"  a category  created  by  the Administration  to  identify and de-
tain potential  targets for war  crimes  prosecutions.  See  In  re Guantdnamo  Detainee Cases,  Nos.
02-CV-02 9 9  et  al.,  2005  U.S.  Dist. LEXIS  1236,  at  "9-IO (D.D.C.  Jan. 31,  2005).  According to
officers  at Guanthnamo  Bay, few  of the  detainees  captured  in  Afghanistan  are  able  to  provide
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valuable  intelligence.  Golden,  supra.  Nonetheless,  hundreds  remained  detained without  being
charged.
After the  Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124  S. Ct. 2633  (2004), that detainees
have a right  to review  of their status, the  Pentagon  established  Combatant Status  Review Tribu-
nals  to  assess  whether  an  individual  is a  member  or supporter  of a  terrorist  organization.  See
Memorandum  from  Deputy  Secretary  of Defense  Paul  Wolfowitz  to the  Secretary  of the  Navy
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ju200 4/d2004o7o7review.pdf;  see also
Carol  D. Leonnig  & Julie  Tate,  Detainee Hearings Bring New  Details, Disputes, WASH.  POST,
Dec.  II,  2004,  at Ai.  According to  a recent  report,  these tribunals  have  rejected  387  of the  393
pleas they have heard.  Jane  Mayer, Annals of Justice: Outsourcing Torture, NEW  YORKER, Feb.
14 & 21,  2005,  at io6, 123.  In  a large majority of the fifty cases reviewed by the  Washington Post,
panels  of three military  officers  for  each case  relied on  classified evidence  withheld  from  the  de-
tainee or on confessions  that may  have  been obtained under duress.  Leonnig  & Tate, supra.  The
Pentagon  granted  no  access  to civilian  lawyers.  Josh  White,  U.S.  To  Tell  Detainees of Rights,
WASH. POST, July  1o,  2004,  at A7.  The government also objected to habeas corpus jurisdiction  in
the federal  courts, but lost that argument  when the Supreme  Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.
Ct. 2686  (2004), that detainees  held at Guantinamo  Bay are  entitled to invoke the  federal  courts'
authority under  federal statutory habeas jurisdiction.  Id. at 2699.
Numerous  court challenges  to  the ongoing  detention at Guantdnamo  Bay have found their
way to the federal  courts.  An  executive  resolution by the  federal district court for the  District of
Columbia invited the judges  whose dockets  held such  cases to transfer  particular common  issues
and motions to Judge Joyce Green.  Judge Richard  Leon did not transfer the motions to dismiss  in
two cases  assigned to  him, however, and  on January  19,  2005,  he issued  an opinion rejecting ha-
beas  challenges  brought  by  seven  foreign  nationals  to  the  President's  authority  to detain  them
without process.  See Khalid  v. Bush, No.  1:04-1142,  2005  U.S. Dist. LEXIS  749, at *i-2 (D.D.C.
Jan.  19,  2005).  The  opinion reasoned that the claimants  had  failed to offer any  grounds  for chal-
lenging the  authority  of the  President  to detain  foreign  nationals  and  had  failed  to  establish  a
right to federal judicial relief rather  than military review process.  Id. at *50.
On  January  31,  20o5,  Judge Green  issued  an opinion,  which  was made  available  in  full to
counsel but only in  part to the  public due to redactions  of classified  material,  on the  other eleven
Guant~namno  detention  cases.  See  Detainee Cases, 2005  U.S.  Dist. LEXIS  1236.  Judge  Green
ruled that, because  they are held  in the exclusive jurisdiction and  control of the United  States, the
detainees  are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment.  Id.  at *63.  She explained:
The Constitution of the United  States is a law for rulers  and people, equally in war  and
in peace,  and covers with the  shield of its  protection  all  classes of men, at all times,  and
under all circumstances.  No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented  by the wit of man than  that any of its provisions  can  be suspended during any
of the  great exigencies of government.  Such a doctrine  leads directly to anarchy or des-
potism,  but the  theory  of  necessity  on  which  it is  based  is  false;  for  the  government,
within the Constitution,  has all the  powers granted  to it, which are  necessary to preserve
its existence;  as has  been happily  proved by the result of the great effort  to throw off its
just authority.
Id. at *62-63.  Given the  length of incarceration  already experienced  by the claimants, and the
government's  inability to articulate  when or how it would determine  that the war on terrorism
has ended,  the  court balanced  the  prospect of life imprisonment against  the  government's  ob-
ligation to protect the country  from terrorist attacks and concluded that more rigorous  proce-
dures  must  be  used  to  help  ensure  that innocent  people  are  not  held  indefinitely.  See id. at
*103-04.  The  court  relied  on  a  prior  protective  order  balancing  the  detainees'  interests
against  the  government's  security  concerns  and  making  classified  information  available  to
counsel who have appropriate  security  clearances  to compensate  for  the detainees'  lack of ac-
cess to classified  information,  id. at *84-88; refused  to dismiss specific  claims that information
used  by  the  tribunals  was allegedly  acquired  by torture  or  coercion,  id. at  *94;  reserved  for
separate hearing  whether the definition  of "enemy combatant" satisfies both the Congressional
Authorization  for  Use  of Military  Force  and constitutional  due  process,  id. at *98;  and pre-
served, despite  the  government's  motion  to  dismiss, allegations  that the detention  of some of
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feld,61  the  government  nonetheless  reasserted  these  arguments  in  re-
sponse  to  the  habeas  petition  of Salim  Ahmed Hamdan,  a  thirty-five-
year-old  Yemeni  who  served  as  a chauffeur  for  Osama bin  Laden  in
Afghanistan.  The  government's  unrepentant  commitment  to its  posi-
tion  is manifest  in  its  appellate  challenge  to  the district  court's  ruling
that (i) it had jurisdiction  to consider Hamdan's claims;  (2)  the Geneva
Conventions  apply to  him, at least in determining  whether he qualifies
for  prisoner-of-war  status;  and  (3) such  an  assessment  must  be  made
by a competent tribunal, as which  the President does not count.62
Once  again,  use of unique and contested military commissions  fails
Ignatieff's  requirement  that  "departures  from  [existing]  due  process
standards"  be "really  necessary"  and  contained  to  the  least  restrictive
possible  and truly  "the  last  resort" (pp.  23-24).63  Moreover,  the  gov-
ernment's  refusal  to  comport  with  the  Geneva  Conventions  could  fail
Ignatieff's  requirement  that lesser-evil  strategies  be  effective  over  the
longer  term.  One  would  think  that this  test could  not  be  met  by  a
strategy  - like  indefinite  detention  without  process  - that  under-
mines  the  government's  moral  legitimacy  at  home  and  abroad.  In-
deed, the reviewing  district court judge in Hamdan's case concluded:
The government  has  asserted  a position  starkly different  from the po-
sitions  and  behavior  of  the  United  States  in  previous  conflicts,  one  that
can  only weaken  the  United  States'  own ability  to demand application  of
the  Geneva  Conventions  to  Americans  captured  during  armed  conflicts
abroad....  [O]ther  governments  have  already  begun  to  cite  the  United
States'  Guantanamo  policy to justify their own repressive policies  ....  64
the  petitioners  violated the  Third  Geneva Convention,  id. at  *1  i  1-12.  The decision  left fur-
ther proceedings to the judges to whom the cases  were originally submitted.  See id. at *115.
Proposed  changes  circulating  within  the  Pentagon  would  bring the  tribunals  more  in  line
with the  procedures  used in  traditional  courts-martial.  Tim Golden,  U.S.  Is Examining Plan To
Bolster Detainee Rights, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar. 27,  2005,  at Ai.  The  Administration  may be  waiting
for  the results of challenges  or may remain resistant to according  detainees  the  rights granted  to
other defendants in U.S.  courts.  Id.
61  124  S. Ct. 2633; see also supra  note  i  (summarizing the Hamdi decision).
62  Hamdan  v.  Rumsfeld,  344  F. Supp.  2d  152,  157-58,  16o,  162  (D.D.C.  2004).  The  govern-
ment failed  in  its effort  to  secure  expedited  review  before  the  Supreme  Court.  See  Hamdan  v.
Rumsfeld,  125  S. Ct. 68o  (2004) (mem.) (denying motion  for expedited consideration  of the petition
for  writ of certiorari).  Its appeal  is  pending.  See Andrew  Zajac,  Trial of bin Laden Driver May
Affect  Hussein Case, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30,  2004, § i, at 8.
63  Similar  analysis  would  extend to the  structure  and provisions  of the  military commissions
established by the Administration,  for  they afford  no protection  against forced confessions  and no
guarantee  of  access  to  counsel.  See  Human  Rights  Watch,  Press  Release,  U.S.:  New Military
Commissions  Threaten  Rights,  Credibility  (Nov. 15,  2ooi), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2ooi/II/
miltribsi I 15.htm.
64  Hamdan, 344  F. Supp.  2d at  163 (citing LAWYERS  COMM. FOR HUMAN  RIGHTS,  ASSESS-
ING THE  NEW NORMAL:  LIBERTY AND  SECURITY FOR THE  POST-SEPTEMBER  I i  UNITED
STATES,  at 7 7-8o (2003)).
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Detentions  without  process  do  not  solve  the  problem  of  domestic  ter-
rorist threats,  to  say  nothing of  danger  from  abroad.  Assessments  of
the  use  of  internment  in  Northern  Ireland  indicate  that  it  did  "not
provide  lasting  solutions"  to terrorism  there;  instead, the  reimposition
of internment  triggered  a spike  in  violence  and "damage[d]  the  fabric
of the community.
'65
Ignatieff  warns  that,  viewed  in  retrospect,  none  of  the  historical
sacrifices  of liberty made  in the name  of security hold up (p.  55).66  He
implicitly warns  that current policies  may suffer the same fate.  Major
elements  of  the  United  States's  response  to  September  ii  fail  Ig-
natieff's  tests  - even  though  he  argues  for pursuing  other  measures
that also depart from our constitutional and ethical traditions.
II.  WHAT SATISFIES THE PRECOMMITMENTS?
Based  strictly  upon  his  criteria  for  legitimacy, Ignatieff's  analysis
seems to  track the  usual liberal critiques  of antiterrorist policies in the
United  States.  Yet  unlike  traditional  liberal  critics,  Ignatieff  would
approve  secret judicial review  of wiretap and other surveillance  appli-
cations  (p.  134);  intelligence  gathering through  deception,  entrapment,
and payment,  all  under  cover  of official  denials  (p.  134);  targeted  as-
sassinations  of  bona  fide  terrorists  actively  engaged  in  "planning  im-
minent  attacks  that  cannot  be  stopped  in  any  other  way"  (p.  133);67
and preemptive  military  action  against  states  harboring  terrorists  and
against individuals  or training camps preparing  imminent attacks  (pp.
162-67).
Despite  objections  by  civil  liberties  advocates,  Ignatieff  explicitly
condones  use of a mandatory  national identity card as a lesser evil,  al-
though  he calls  for legislation  restricting both the kind of data that can
be retrieved through it and access to that data (pp. 78-79).  Ignatieff is
65  Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann,  Into the Fire:  How To Avoid Getting Burned by
the  Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO  L. REV.  1657,
I701  (2003)  (alteration  in original)  (quoting HOUSE  OF COMMONS  COMM.  ON MEASURES  TO
DEAL  WITH  TERRORISM  IN  N.  IRELAND,  CMND.  5847,  MEASURES  To  DEAL  WITH
TERRORISM  IN NORTHERN  IRELAND  7-8 (975))  (internal quotation marks omitted).
66  The  Red  Scare  of I919, in  Ignatieff's view, offers  a more  analogous  historical  example  for
the  nation after September  ii  than the assault  on Pearl  Harbor (p.  55).  History,  Ignatieff argues,
shows that democracies harm themselves  by misjudging the nature of external  threats.  Reviewing
responses  to terrorism  by  Czarist  Russia;  Weimar  Germany;  Algeria  and  France  in  the  195os;
Northern Ireland and Great Britain from the  I96OS  to the present; Argentina, Peru, and Columbia
in  the  197os;  and  Israel  in  the  past decade  (pp.  63-78), he  concludes  that "the historical  record
shows that while no democracy  has ever been brought down  by terror, all democracies  have been
damaged by it, chiefly by their own overreactions"  (p. 80).
67  Ignatieff  argues  that targeted  assassinations  are  a legitimate  lesser  evil  when  less violent
alternatives  endanger U.S.  personnel, when the targets are planning  imminent attacks that cannot
be  prevented  by alternative  means, and  when  "all  reasonable  precautions  are  taken  to minimize
collateral damage  and civilian harms" (p. 133).
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far  more  sanguine  about  the  risks  of such  policies  than  others,  who
have  documented  abuses  in  historical  uses  of  such  national  identity
cards. 6 8   He  misses,  though,  perhaps  the  best  argument  for  his  posi-
tion: in effect,  this nation is  already indirectly creating  a system  of na-
tional  identity  cards  by  devising  federal  standards  to  regulate  state
driver's licenses.69  As  Ignatieff wants  to  restrict invasions  of individ-
ual  liberty  to  the  greatest  extent  possible,  he  should  have  compared
this de facto national  identity card system with a more explicit and de-
liberate process  - setting uniform national  standards - that reflects a
commitment  to  open  and  adversarial  legislative  review.  A deliberate
and transparent  process  arguably  could better  balance  concerns  about
individual  freedom  and  national  security  than  the  de  facto  use  of
driver's  licenses.  Instead,  with biometric  material  already  within  the
reach  of regulators,  the  central  privacy concerns  involve  not whether
government can  check  identities  but rather  when  it may  do  so,  based
on  what  threshold  of  evidence  and  in  conjunction  with  what  other
data sources.  Again,  planning  for the  use of and  limitations  on  such
identify  verification  capabilities  - and  ensuring  national  debate  on
the  issues  - would  better  guard  individual  freedom  than  simply
standing by  as  increasingly  intrusive  public  and  private  security  sys-
tems develop  on an  ad hoc basis.
Ignatieff's  analysis  also  would  allow  the  FBI  and  the  Attorney
General secretly  to apply  for and  to use  electronic surveillance  of tele-
phone  and  Internet  communications,  which  can  be  authorized  solely
by the Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court (p.  134). 7 0  That court's
proceedings  can  be held  in secret  and  ex parte  simply upon a showing
that "the  information  likely  to  be  obtained  is  foreign  intelligence  in-
68  See,  e.g.,  Richard  Sobel,  The Degradation  of Political  Identity Under a National Identifica-
tion System,  8  B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.  L.  37,  48-55  (2oo2).  As  other  commentators  have noted,
however, it may be possible to design a system consistent with  the civil liberties guaranteed  by the
Constitution.  See Daniel  J. Steinbock,  National Identity  Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697,  701 (2004).
69  See  Matthew  L.  Wald,  U.S.  To  Specify  Documents Needed for Driver's Licenses,  N.Y.
TIMES,  Dec. 9,  2004, at A36.
70  Although  intended  for foreign  surveillance,  the investigations authorized  in this process  can
often involve American  citizens and domestic  law enforcement.  The court and the Attorney Gen-
eral have  devoted considerable  effort to structuring guidelines for both cooperation  and  separation
between  foreign surveillance  activities and domestic  law enforcement.  See, e.g., In re All Matters
Submitted  to the  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court,  218 F. Supp.  2d  61i,  613 (Foreign  Int.
Surv. Ct.  2002);  Grayson  A.  Hoffman,  Note, Litigating Terrorism: The  New  FISA  Regime,  the
Wall, and the Fourth Amendment, 4o AM.  CRIM. L. REV.  1655 (2003).  The  boon to domestic  law
enforcement  from  the  new  tools  enabled  by  the  counterterrorism  push,  with  the  social benefits
and  incursions on  individual  rights it implies, should  not be underestimated.  Government  agen-
cies similarly use September  i I  laws to  increase secrecy  about unflattering news.  Lyric  Wallwork
Winik, Shine the Light on Government Secrets, PARADE, Mar.  13, 2005,  at 15.
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formation  ...  or  is relevant  to  an  ongoing  investigation."71   These  in-
vestigations  can  reach  inside  private  residences,  which  could  depart
from  the  Supreme  Court's  Fourth  Amendment  doctrine.72  Ignatieff
seems  to  rely  here  on  a  general  implication  that  foreign  intelligence
gathering  requires  departures  from  prevailing  due  process  standards
without  even  trying  less  invasive  methods  (pp.  133-34).1
3   He  ulti-
mately describes  the Foreign Intelligence  Surveillance Court  as a secret
court  capable  of  subjecting  rights  violations  to  judicial  review,  al-
though  he  is  frustratingly  noncommittal  with  respect  to  the  potential
for these courts  actually  to prevent  rights violations  from  taking place
(P.  134).
But is  that court  really  as  protective  of privacy  rights  as  Ignatieff
hopes?  Given  its  secrecy,  how  would  Ignatieff,  or  any  of  us,  know?
Here, Ignatieff struggles to reconcile  his historical  analysis with his op-
timism  regarding highly  secret and  unaccountable  tribunals.  He  con-
cludes  that a  greater  threat  to democracy  comes  from  overreaction  to
terror  than  from  terrorism  itself  (pp.  57-62,  80);  that  processes  for
pruning  emergency  legislation  are  necessary  to  counteract  this  overre-
action  (p.  8o);  and  that  a democracy  should  come  to  see  its  commit-
ments  to  restraining  executive  power,  open  debate,  and  individual
freedom  as  strengths,  not  weaknesses  (pp.  59-63).  To  be  consistent
with  his  insistence  on  open  and  democratic  debate,  then,  Ignatieff
would  have  to  demand  a  process  of  review  and  reassessment  - by
Congress  and ideally by  the  electorate - to test how  well the  Foreign
Intelligence  Surveillance  Court has  protected  the  individual  freedoms
71  50  U.S.C.A.  §  1842(c)(2)  (West Supp.  2004).  The Patriot Act modified  preexisting  criminal
procedure  rules  - and  perhaps  constitutional  standards  - by  allowing  "sneak-and-peek"
searches that permit officers to delay  notice to the  subject  of a search  without  a prior showing  of
necessity.  See USA  PATRIOT  Act  of  2001,  Pub.  L.  No.  107-56,  § 213,  115  Stat.  272,  285-86
(amending  18 U.S.C.  § 31o3a(b) (20oo));  see  also ACLU  v. United  States  Dep't of Justice,  265  F.
Supp.  2d  20,  24 &  n.5  (D.D.C.  2003)  (noting that the Patriot Act modifies the  requirement of no-
tice  in  Federal  Rule  of Criminal  Procedure  41  "and perhaps  in  the  Constitution  as well").  The
Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court itself  concluded that the  Patriot Act may depart from the
Fourth Amendment  but adheres  closely  enough  to existing constitutional standards  to  withstand
balancing-test  scrutiny  in view  of the  nature  of the  terrorist threat.  See In re Sealed  Case Nos.
02-001,  02-002,  310 F3d 717,  746 (Foreign Int.  Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
72  See  Rita  Shulman,  Note,  USA  Patriot Act:  Granting the  U.S.  Government the  Unprece-
dented Power To  Circumvent American Civil Liberties in the  Name of National Security, 80  U.
DET. MERCY  L. REV. 427,  429-34  (2003)  ("The trap and  trace provisions  ...  are  contrary  to the
recent Supreme Court decision in Kyllo v. United States."). In Kyllo v.  United States, 533 U.S.  27
(2001),  the  Supreme  Court  held that the  Fourth  Amendment  prohibits  the  use  of electronic  sur-
veillance  equipment  in  the absence  of  a warrant.  Id.  at 40.  Presumably, Ignatieff  is  imagining
surveillance authorized  by a warrant - but  a warrant issued  under the  secret  and less  stringent
legal standards used  by the Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court.  See infra p.  2154  (noting an
apparent pattern of FISA court approval of nearly all requests for  surveillance).
73  One alternative  to the secret FISA court would be the  use of in camera  proceedings by regu-
lar Article  III courts, which not only are subject to appellate review, but also proceed  in the open,
except for review of specific, classified,  or privileged evidence.
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he  thinks critical to a democracy's  precommitments.  Public review  -
even  long after the fact - is crucial  if official misconduct  is  to  be  de-
terred  and  members  of the  broader  community  are  to weigh  in  about
what should  be  done  in their name. 74  The  use  of in  camera  proceed-
ings  may  well  be  essential  to  avoid  jeopardizing  ongoing  intelligence
investigations, but the absence  of publicity calls for some kind of over-
sight to substitute  for  the  accountability  otherwise  provided  by  public
and media review.
Episodes in  American  history  reveal jeopardy  to democratic  values
unless  public scrutiny persists  even  in  times of perceived danger.  The
official  misinterpretation  and  misrepresentation  of  the  actual  threat
posed  during  World  War  II  by  Japanese  and Japanese  Americans  in
the  United  States75  stands  as  a  stark  reminder  of internment  as  our
massive  national  failure.  Ignatieff  expresses  worry  over  potentially
permanent damage  to  democracy  from unaccountable  agents  working
in secret to distort the  public's understanding  of the  risks they face and
the  measures  necessary  to  address  those  threats  (p.  155).  How  and
when  could  we  know  if such  a misinformation  campaign  were under-
way in  the  practices  of  the  Attorney  General  or the  FBI,  with secret
proceedings  of the  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court  as the  only
source  of independent  oversight?  Evidence  available  already  suggests
that, in  practice,  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court  has  pro-
vided  no  demonstrable  check  on  administrative  requests.
76   It  is  not
clear  how Ignatieff would  assess this pattern  of consistent judicial  ac-
74  It may  be  more  an  article  of faith  than  an  empirically demonstrated  truth,  but  there  are
numerous  assertions  of  the  democratic  value  of public  hearings  throughout  American  jurispru-
dence.  These benefits include  guarding against "any attempt to employ our courts  as instruments
of persecution," In re Oliver, 333  U.S.  257,  270  (1948); permitting  citizens to  keep  a watchful  eye
on  the  workings  of public  agencies,  cf. State ex  rel. Colscott  v. King,  57  N.E.  535,  535-39  (Ind.
i9oo);  contributing  to public  debate,  see  Nixon  v. Warner  Communications,  Inc.,  435  U.S.  589,
603,  6o9  (1978);  affording  the community the  assurance  that  proceedings  were  conducted  fairly
and  consistently  with  the demands  of due  process,  Richmond  Newspapers,  Inc.  v. Virginia, 448
U.S.  555,  569  (98);  and  checking  abuse,  promoting  public  debate  about  the  operation  of law,
and  enhancing  public  confidence  in  the workings  of government, see Debra D.  Stafford, The  Ad-
vocate for Military Defense  Counsel: "Secret Trials": A Defense  Perspective, ARMY  LAW.,  Apr.
1988, at 24-25.
75  Crucial to  uncovering  the evidence  of this  misinterpretation  and  misrepresentation  was the
research  published in IRONS,  supra note  2 i.  Will future  historians find documents  from  our era
that will even  allow such an expos6 of secret  intelligence gathering?
76  For  further  discussion  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  FISA  court,  compare  ALAN  M.
DERSHOWITZ,  WHY  TERRORISM  WORKS:  UNDERSTANDING  THE  THREAT, RESPONDING
TO  THE  CHALLENGE  158-63  (20o2),  with  PHILIP  B.  HEYMANN,  TERRORISM,  FREEDOM,
AND  SECURITY:  WINNING  WITHOUT  WAR  III (2003).  See also infra note 8I  (discussing Pro-
fessor Heymann's  response to Professor Dershowitz's proposal).  For further skepticism  about the
effectiveness  of judicial  review  to guard  against  race-based  abuses in  antiterrorism,  see  Thomas
W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power,  Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race
Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM.  HUM. RTS. L. REV.  I  (2002).
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quiescence  or  what  pattern  would  challenge  his  assumption  that  the
court affords adequate independent  review.77
Similarly, Ignatieff  does  not explain  precisely  how  to  ensure  that
the  lesser-evil  tactics  he  supports  - including  intelligence  gathering
through deception,  entrapment,  and payments,  all  under  cover of offi-
cial  denials  (p.  134);  targeted  assassinations  of bona  fide  terrorists  ac-
tively engaged  in  planning imminent attacks (p.  133);78  and preemptive
military  action  against  states  harboring  training  camps  or  terrorists
preparing  imminent  attacks  (pp.  162-67)  - meet  his tests  of least  re-
strictive  means  necessary  and  last  resort.  Presumably,  he  would  re-
quire careful argument  and discussion,  including adversarial  presenta-
tion,  although  it  is  not  clear  how  such  a  procedure  would  work.
Would  each  targeted  assassination  be  permissible  so  long  as  subse-
quent  legislative  or judicial  oversight  occurred  - even  if  conducted
secretly, and perhaps  not for  some  time?  Although  Ignatieff  concedes
that adversarial  presentations  must take  place - both  to deter bad of-
ficial conduct and to permit exploration  of actual alternatives - on his
view, secrecy could be permitted at least for an unspecified  period.  Ig-
natieff's  concerns  about  overreaction  and  misjudgments  imply  that
democratic  review, before too long, must also proceed, lest official mis-
calculation  about  the scope  of a threat go untested  by the light of pub-
lic  scrutiny.  Democratic  review  would compel  disclosure  to the public
about  the  government's  practices  and  create  opportunities  to  test
whether  lesser-evil  measures  were  mistakenly  adopted.7 9  Ignatieff's
optimism  about  the efficacy of judicial and democratic  review - even
if entirely  secret  - is  in  considerable  tension  with  his  insistence  that
democracies  take  seriously  their commitments to  individual rights and
democratic  accountability.  In addition,  the book's  vague  treatment  of
77  Perhaps  he  hopes  that, when  combined  with  executive  accountability, congressional  over-
sight, and  an  engaged  media, judicial  review  can  do more  than  simply defer  to  administrative
claims  of necessity.  See infra p.  2163-64 (discussing executive  accountability).  Although Ignatieff
could be more candid about the limitations  of judicial  review when the judges themselves  feel the
press of emergency and defer to officials,  he is right to find crucial contributions that judicial (and
congressional  and media) review of executive  action can make.  If officials  know  and believe  that
review  will be  more than  a rubber stamp and will become  public even  if at a later time, they  will
think twice, justify their decisions,  and, at the margin,  refrain  from some actions.  The  fact of re-
view  thus  can deter some  degree  of overreaching.  Moreover, after  the  fact, the very operation  of
review  can generate  public debate  about both  the effectiveness  of lesser-evil  policies  and whether
the  measures  were worth  their  costs.  It is often  because  of official review  that historical records
become  available  for debate  and critique.  Official  review  and  the reactions it generates  may thus
supply  materials  that create  and  sustain  a  democratic  culture  of  self-governance  and  mutual
persuasion.
78  See supra note 67.
79  Such  disclosure  is  especially  unlikely, though,  when leading  officials  seem  allergic  to media
and public awareness.  Cf. RIcHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S
WAR ON  TERROR  257  (2004) (quipping that  Secretary  of Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld  may  think
that lots of Americans,  including half the  Pentagon press corps, are enemies).
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some  critical  lesser  evils  makes  it difficult  to determine  whether  those
policies comport with Ignatieff's standards.
III.  WHAT CAN  WE TELL ONLY WITH MORE  SPECIFICITY?
Without  much  elaboration,  Ignatieff  first  directs  policymakers  to
subject  any  coercive  measure  to  the  "dignity  test,"  which  absolutely
would forbid  cruel  and  unusual punishment,  penal  servitude, extraju-
dicial  execution,  rendition  of  suspects  to  rights-abusing  countries,  and
torture  (pp.  23-24).80  Apparently, these  practices  cross the line  beyond
the  acceptable  by turning  us into  what we  swear  not to be.81  It may
be  the  lawyer's  occupational  hazard,  but I  find  it difficult  here  not to
desire  specific  definitions  and  examples  of  both  permissible  and  for-
bidden  lesser  evils to  clarify  each  of these  absolute  prohibitions.82  A
comparison  of these  broad  prohibitions  to  the  United  States's  current
lesser-evil  policies  demonstrates  that  the  "dignity  test"  is  set  forth  in
strokes  too broad  to provide  a meaningful  guidepost for legitimate  ac-
tion  by a  democratic  government.  Does  Ignatieff  mean  to  dispute -
as I would - the Bush Administration's  claim that neither the  Geneva
Conventions  nor  the  U.S.  Constitution  apply  to  American  interroga-
tions  of foreigners  overseas  to  prohibit the  use  of torture  or  cruel,  in-
human,  or degrading  treatment? 8 3  By  attaching  a  reservation  to  the
80  In  finally turning  to so  basic  a concept  as  human  dignity, Ignatieff  may  implicitly  be  ac-
knowledging  that no set  of principles,  including  his six  tests, sufficiently captures  the underlying
purpose  of maintaining  ethics  while combating  terror;  nor does  any  set  of principles  effectively
direct how  to weigh  each consideration  or indicate  whether any  one  should  have  decisive  value.
As he ultimately sets  aside  tests and calls  instead for democratic  persuasion (p.  169), Ignatieff im-
plicitly  acknowledges  the truth that all moral and legal  codes depend  more  on the people  who en-
force  and comply with them than on  any verbal formulation.
81  Differing  empirical  assessments  about how  best to curb  official  abuse  in combating terror-
ism may explain Ignatieff's disagreement  with Alan Dershowitz's proposal to  legalize  torture sub-
ject to a warrant that would require explicit advance  justification.  See DERSHOWITZ,  supra note
76,  at 158-63.  Ignatieff  treats this proposal  as  a "well-intentioned"  effort  to bring the  rule of law
into the  interrogation  room,  but predicts  that "[1Iegalization  of physical force in interrogation  will
hasten the  process by which it becomes routine" (p.  140).  Philip  Heymann  agrees with Ignatieff's
conclusion  and further  argues  that relying on judges  to  monitor  torture  through  the warrant  re-
quirement  would  be  a bad  bet  because  "[jiudges  have deferred  to the  last fourteen  thousand  re-
quests  for national security  wiretaps  and  they  would defer  here."  HEYMANN, supra note  76,  at
I i i.  This same  point should  raise doubts - for Ignatieff and for others - about reliance  on the
Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Court even to  monitor searches  and surveillance,  as it currently
does, to say nothing of the expansive  oversight role that Ignatieff suggests  the court could play.
82  Sharply defined  rules clarify  what is  covered,  what  is  not  covered,  and what  is  unantici-
pated.  The  inability  of commanders  to  oversee  - and  prevent  abuses  at - the  Abu  Ghraib
prison, for  example,  was blamed at least in part on the  absence of clear rules.  Eric  Schmitt, New
Interrogation  Rules Set for Detainees in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1o,  2005, at Ai.
83  See Memorandum  from Assistant Attorney  General Jay  S.  Bybee  to William J. Haynes, II,
General  Counsel,  Department  of  Defense  (Feb.  26,  2002),  in  THE  TORTURE  PAPERS:  THE
ROAD  TO  ABU  GHRAIB  144,  145,  153-69  (Karen  J.  Greenberg  &  Joshua  L.  Dratel  eds.,  2005)
[hereinafter  THE TORTURE  PAPERS];  Memorandum  from President  George  W. Bush to the  Vice
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Convention  Against  Torture  and Other  Cruel, Inhuman  or Degrading
Treatment  or Punishment 4 - binding  itself only to the extent interro-
gation,  detention,  or  punishment  is  prohibited  by  the  Fifth,  Eighth,
and  Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the  U.S.  Constitution  - does  the
United  States  hold itself to a  lower standard  than  international  law?85
Does the  Eighth Amendment notion of "cruel  and  unusual" apply  only
to punishment or also to interrogation  and detention?8 6  Even defining
what  is  "cruel and  unusual  punishment" has  proved  notoriously  con-
troversial  - especially  as the  United  States excludes  most death  pen-
alty  cases  from  that category  while  most  international  human  rights
law  reaches  the  opposite  conclusion.'  Conversely, penal  servitude  is
permitted  under some traditions  for acts of high gravity, 8  yet Ignatieff
does not explain why  his test would  permit the  death penalty but  pro-
hibit  this  less  severe  punishment.  Extrajudicial  execution  is  less  am-
biguously objectionable  - for  all its faults,  a judicially imposed  death
sentence  at  least  provides  minimal  procedural  safeguards.  Yet  Ig-
President, the  Secretaries  of State and Defense,  the Attorney General, and  Other  Officials (Feb.  7,
2002),  in  THE  TORTURE  PAPERS  134,  134-35.  The  U.S.  government  argued  that  the  federal
courts lack jurisdiction  to consider objections  under the  Geneva Conventions  and the U.S. Consti-
tution  to detentions  at  Guantdnamo  Bay, and  also  asserted that  such  judicial review  would  dis-
turb the separation  of powers  mandated by the  Constitution.  Brief for the  Respondents, Rasul  v.
Bush,  124  S.  Ct. 2686  (2004)  (No.  03-334),  available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s69News
DocumentOrderFileUploadOO/17Ofrespondent.brief.pdf.  The  Supreme  Court rejected  these  ar-
guments.  Rasul, 124  S. Ct. at 2699.
84  Adopted  Dec.  io,  1984,  S. TREATY  DOc.  NO.  100-20  (1988),  1465  U.N.T.S.  113 (entered
into force June  26,  1987) [hereinafter  Convention  Against Torture].
85  The American  Bar Association  produced and endorsed  a report that suggested that "severe
sleep deprivation,"  hooding, "threat[s]  of torture," and exposure to cold all constitute violations  of
the U.S. Constitution  in detention  or interrogation  contexts.  A.B.A.,  American  Bar Ass'n  Report
to  the  House  of  Delegates  (Aug.  9,  2004),  in  THE  TORTURE  PAPERS,  supra note  83,  at  M132,
1138.
86  Some judicial authority indicates  that protections  for detainees are  at least as  great as  those
extended  to convicted  prisoners.  See, e.g.,  Graham  v. Connor, 490  U.S.  386,  398  (1989);  City of
Revere v. Mass.  Gen.  Hosp.,  463  U.S.  239,  244  (0983); Hamm  v. DeKalb  County, 744  F.2d  1567,
1573-74  (iith  Cir.  1985),  cert. denied, 475  U.S.  1O96  (1986).  Yet  more  recently,  the  Supreme
Court has indicated  that what shocks the  conscience under  the Fourteenth  Amendment varies  by
context, and that the  relatively calm  context  of post-conviction  custody may demand  higher stan-
dards  for acceptable  official  conduct  than the  more  unpredictable  context of a police  chase.  See
County of Sacramento  v. Lewis, 523  U.S.  833,  850-51  (1998).  This  analysis suggests greater leni-
ence  for  interrogation  and  detention  in  the  antiterrorism  initiative  proceeding  not  only  prior  to
conviction, but also prior to trial and indictment.
87  See Mary  K.  Newcomer,  Note, Arbitrariness and the  Death Penalty in an International
Context, 45  DUKE  L.J.  611,  620  (1995)  ("The continued  imposition  of the  death  penalty  in  the
United States distinguishes this  country from  much  of the international  community.");  id. at 620-
41.  But see Roper  v. Simmons,  125  S.  Ct.  1183,  1200  (2005)  (concluding, as  has most of the inter-
national community,  that the  prohibition  on cruel  and  unusual  punishment "forbid[s]  imposition
of the death  penalty on  offenders  who were  under  the age of  18  when  their  crimes were commit-
ted").
88  See, e.g., Code  Penal Militaire art. lO9  (Switz.).
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natieff leaves unclear whether  an execution  ordered by  a military com-
mission would qualify  as extrajudicial.
Similarly, though  rendition  of  suspects  to  rights-abusing  countries
could  be the worst form of hypocrisy, 8 9 Ignatieff leaves unanswered the
harder  question:  whether  transferring  individuals  to  U.S.  facilities  in
those  other countries  would  be prohibited  by  the same  principle.  Ig-
natieff's prohibition  of transfer  under  these  circumstances  leaves  sev-
eral important questions  unanswered:  Would it be permissible to trans-
fer  an  individual  to  a  country  known  to  use  torture  if  there  were
reliable assurances  that the  individual  would  not be  tortured  there?9 0
What, if anything,  could  be  a reliable  assurance  from  a  government
known  to  use  torture  or other  means  forbidden  in the  United  States?
What if the individual faced coercive  interrogation,  but not torture?9'
89  Pretending  to comply with law and  ethics while  getting others  to do your dirty work seems
paradigmatic  of hypocrisy.  Cf  Raymond  Thibodeaux,  Once-Prosperous Sudanese Scavenge  To
Survive,  BOSTON  GLOBE,  Aug.  24,  2004,  at Ai  (reporting  that the  Sudanese  government  has
tried  to distance  itself from genocidal Janjaweed paramilitary  forces it  once supported).  Nonethe-
less, the  United  States  government apparently - and secretly  - renders uncooperative  prisoners
to  Egypt, Jordan,  and  other  countries  willing  to  use  aggressive  questioning  methods,  including
torture.  See  Tom  Lue,  Appendix  B:  Coercive  Interrogations, in  PHILIP  B.  HEYMANN  &
JULIETTE  N.  KAYYEM,  PRESERVING  SECURITY  AND  DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS  IN  THE
WAR  ON TERRORISM  155,  155  &  n.5,  158  &  n.24  (2004) [hereinafter  PRESERVING  SECURITY
AND  DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS]  (citing  Eric Licthblau &  Adam Liptak,  Questioning  To Be Le-
gal, Humane and Aggressive, the White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,  2003,  at AI 3; and Dana
Priest  & Joe  Stephens,  Secret  World of  U.S.  Interrogation:  Long History of Tactics  in  Overseas
Prisons Is  Coming to  Light, WASH.  POST, May  I1,  2004,  at Ai,  for  evidence  that the  United
States  renders  prisoners  to  nations  that  engage  in  torture),  available  at  http://bcsia.ksg.
harvard.edu/BCSIA-content/documents/LTLSfinal_02-o5.pdf;  Mayer, supra note  60, at  107.
90  See PRESERVING  SECURITY  AND DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS,  supra note  89, at  24 (rec-
ommending such a policy).  For further discussion  of this report, see infra p.  2161.
91  Some  commentators  have argued  that  the  United  States  may  feel  more  free  to  send  indi-
viduals  to countries  where they  face cruel,  inhuman, or degrading  treatment - prohibited  by the
U.S. Constitution - than  to those where they face  torture.  Lue, supra note 89, at 162  ("According
to  some  commentators,...  although  Congress  prohibits  U.S. officials  from deporting  any  person
to a country where  it is more  likely than not he  will  be tortured, officials  may nonetheless deport
persons  to countries  where  they  will  face  cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment  that would  be
unconstitutional  if applied  in the United States."  (footnote omitted) (citing Omnibus Consolidated
and  Emerigency  Supplemental  Appropriations  Act of  1999,  Pub. L.  No.  105-277,  §  2242(a),  112
Stat. 2681,  2681-822  (1998);  and John T.  Parry, What Is  Torture, Are  We Doing It,  and What if We
Are?, 64  U. PITT. L. REV.  237,  245  n.42  (2003))).  Challenges  to rendition  practices  may  lead  to
judicially imposed restrictions.  See Abdah  v. Bush, No.  04-1254,  2005  U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4144, at
*17-18 (D.D.C.  Mar.  12,  2005)  (granting a temporary  restraining  order to  prevent the  removal of
thirteen  detainees  from  Guantd.namo  Bay  and  their  rendition  to  another  government);  David
Johnston, Judge Limits the Transfer of 13 from Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,  2005,  at A14
(reporting decision by Judge  Henry Kennedy  to forbid transfer  of thirteen  detainees  absent notice
to the court and an opportunity for legal challenge to the removal).
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And  what, precisely,92  is  the  line  between  torture  and coercive,  inhu-
man, or degrading interrogation?
93
92  There are principled  arguments against defining a concept like torture.  Setting forth a pre-
cise definition  may  invite  conduct  right up  to the  line  rather  than  deterring conduct  that  comes
anywhere  close.  Jeremy  Waldron  has  identified this difficulty  while specifically  warning  against
the  project of defining torture.  See generally Jeremy  Waldron, Torture  and  Positive  Law: Juris-
prudence  for  the  White House  12-13  (Nov. 4,  2004) (unpublished  manuscript, presented  at the
Public  Law  Workshop  at Harvard  Law  School,  on  file  with  the Harvard  Law  School Library).
Especially critical  of government lawyers  who produced  memoranda  narrowing the definition  of
torture  and providing a legal basis for  the government's conduct at GuantAnamo Bay and in Iraq,
Waldron  argues  that such  efforts are  not only fraught with  difficulty, but also neglect  and  inter-
fere  with  the prohibition against  torture  as an archetype and  thereby  create an  unfortunate  sym-
bol for  other areas of law.  Id.  at 12-13, 45-48.
93  Receiving new  philosophical  attention, the distinction  between torture and coercive  interro-
gation may  turn on whether the  acts in question  are performed  with  the intention  of intimidating
or terrorizing the subjects.  Cf. Jeremy  Waldron, Terrorism and the Uses of Terror, 8 J. ETHICS  5,
io-i6 (2004).  The  distinction  between lawful  coercive  interrogation  and  unlawful  torture  often,
however,  seems obscure  in practice.  See supra p.  2135  (discussing the Red  Cross's description  of
the  treatment of Guantdnamo  detainees as  "tantamount to torture").  Nonetheless,  the distinction
between  coercive  interrogation  and  torture,  however  obscure,  certainly  matters.  For example,
U.S. law subjects interrogators  working outside the  United States to prosecution  if they engage  in
torture,  but not if they use  cruel, inhuman, or degrading  means.  See  18  U.S.C.A.  § 234oA  (West
Supp.  2004).  Senator John  McCain,  who experienced  torture  when  he was a  prisoner of war  in
North  Vietnam, has specifically  proposed prohibiting "cruel, inhumane  or degrading treatment  or
punishment."  Sonni  Efron,  Debate Seeks  To  Define Torture, L.A. TIMES,  Jan.  23,  2005,  at Ai.
The  Senate dropped  that language  from  an intelligence bill  after then-National  Security  Advisor
Condeleeza  Rice  objected that it "provide[d]  legal  protections  to foreign  prisoners  to which they
are not now entitled."  Id. (quoting letter from Rice) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The  distinction  between  torture  and cruel,  inhuman,  and  degrading  treatment or  punish-
ment mattered  significantly  to the working  group of lawyers  appointed  by the  general counsel  of
the  U.S. Department of Defense to  report on  the legal  constraints on  interrogation  of persons de-
tained by the United States in  the "war on terrorism."  In  what became, once leaked to the media,
a controversial document,  the  initially secret  report  not only argued that  the federal  law against
torture did not apply to conduct at Guantinamo Bay, but also authorized an exceedingly  narrow
interpretation  of prohibited  conduct  to permit  infliction of pain and suffering if doing so was not
the  interrogator's  express  purpose and if mental suffering was not severe  or prolonged.  Working
Group Report  on Detainee  Interrogations  in the Global  War on  Terrorism: Assessment  of Legal,
Historical,  Policy,  and  Operational  Considerations  (Apr. 4,  2oo3), in THE  TORTURE  PAPERS,
supra  note 83, at 286, 290-96.  This narrow interpretation  distinguishes the scope of U.S.  law from
that of the  Convention  Against  Torture  and Other  Cruel,  Inhuman,  or Degrading  Treatment  or
Punishment,  which  more  broadly  - and  in  the  eyes  of  the  working  group,  more  vaguely  -
banned cruel,  inhuman, or degrading treatment in  addition to torture.  See id. at 288-9o; see also
Convention  Against  Torture,  supra note  84.  The  Working  Group  Report  followed  an  earlier
memo interpreting  the  federal  statute  against  torture  to encompass  "only extreme  acts" causing
the  victim to "experience  intense  pain  or suffering of the  kind  that is  equivalent to the  pain that
would be associated with  serious physical  injury so severe that death,  organ failure,  or permanent
damage  resulting  in a loss of significant body function  will  likely result."  Memorandum  from Jay
S.  Bybee,  Assistant Attorney General,  to Alberto  R. Gonzales,  Counsel  to  the  President (Aug.  i,
2oo2), in  THE TORTURE  PAPERS, supra note 83, at  172,  183.  No direct evidence  links  these two
memoranda  and  the  uses of forced  nudity, muzzled dogs,  and  sexual  humiliation  of detainees  at
Abu Ghraib and GuantAnamo  Bay, but observers suggest that the legal  advice opened the way for
abuse  or  reflected a "systematic  decision"  to  permit coercive  tactics.  Karen  J.  Greenberg,  From
Fear to Torture, in THE TORTURE  PAPERS, supra note  83,  at xvii,  xix;  see also Anthony  Lewis,
Introduction to THE TORTURE  PAPERS, supra note  83, at xiii, xvi (quoting former  National  Se-
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Even  without  sharper  definitions,  Ignatieff's  advocacy  of  prohibi-
tions  on  cruel  and  unusual  punishment,  penal  servitude,  extrajudicial
execution,  rendition of suspects to rights-abusing  countries, and torture
stand  in  striking  contrast to  his  rejection  of absolute  bans  on  aggres-
sive  and  internationally  controversial  interrogations,  targeted  assassi-
nations,  and  other  violence.  Ignatieff  acknowledges  the  danger  that
the prohibited practices  could  draw antiterrorism into the very kind of
limitless  violence  it is  meant to  oppose  (pp.  119-2o).  Nonetheless,  ac-
cording  to  Ignatieff,  a  firm  line  between  violence  and  nonviolence
cannot  mark  the  distinction  between  the  prohibited  and the  permissi-
ble for one practical  if colloquially  stated reason:  "Liberal states cannot
be  protected  by  herbivores"  (p.  121).  What,  then,  keeps  it  a liberal
state?  For Ignatieff,  it is  a combination  of commitment  to  the rule  of
law  and  cultivation  of  individual  character.  Permitted  to  use  some
violence,  the  liberal  state  needs  rules, procedures  for oversight,  and  a
sense  of individual  and  community  conscience,  since  "if we  need  car-
nivores  to  defend  us,  keeping  them  in  check,  keeping  them  aware  of
what it is they are defending,  is a recurrent challenge"  (p.  12 1).
In his most detailed  discussion of this challenge,  Ignatieff acknowl-
edges that torture  "gets  out of control"  and "becomes  lawless"  (p.  140)
- and  then  argues that an  even  more  decisive  reason  for an  outright
ban  is  the  moral  harm  to  those  responsible  for  carrying  it  out  (p.
142).
9 4  Yet  he  would, within  limits,  permit coercive  interrogation  (p.
curity Advisor Donald  P. Gregg).  A week  before  the Senate confirmation  hearing  on the  nomina-
tion of Alberto  Gonzales to  be  Attorney  General  of the United  States,  the Department  of Justice
issued a new  torture  policy  repudiating  the  narrow  interpretation  taken  in  the  prior Department
of Justice memoranda.  Efron, supra.  Notwithstanding  this prohibition,  the  government has  re-
cently  conceded that it uses evidence  obtained  by torture when deciding whether to extend deten-
tions at  Guantdnamo  Bay.  See Michael J.  Sniffen, Panel  OK's Torture in Detention of Enemies,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3,  2004,  at A29.
94  Ignatieff wrote  before  the revelations that U.S. military guards in the Abu  Ghraib  prison in
Iraq  beat and sodomized  detainees  - in  addition  to using electrodes  and pouring phosphoric  acid
on  them - but could  well have  had in  mind  similar scenarios  involving unequivocal  torture  by
poorly  trained, unsupervised  soldiers.  Curiously, Ignatieff defines  torture as "the deliberate  inflic-
tion  of physical cruelty and pain  in order to  extract information"  (p.  136) (emphasis added).  Yet
common  definitions  of torture  in  international  law include  intentional  infliction  of severe  mental
as  well  as  physical  pain.  See,  e.g.,  Convention  Against  Torture,  supra note  84,  art.  i(i),  S.
TREATY  DOC.  NO.  100-2o  at I9,  1465  U.N.T.S. at  113; Rome  Statute of the International Crimi-
nal  Court, July  17,  1998, art. 7, § 2(e), U.N.  Doc. A/Conf.I83/9 (2oo2), available at http://www.un.
org/law/icc/statute/english/romestatute(e).pdf;  see  also  J.  HERMAN  BURGERS  &  HANS
DANELIUS,  THE  UNITED NATIONS  CONVENTION AGAINST  TORTURE:  A  HANDBOOK  ON
THE  CONVENTION  AGAINST  TORTURE  AND  OTHER  CRUEL,  INHUMAN  OR  DEGRADING
TREATMENT  OR PUNISHMENT  41  (1988); Johan  D. van  der  Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under
International  Law, 67 ALB.  L. REV. 427, 427,  432  (2003).  Although  perhaps  it was not his intent,
Ignatieff's  definition  is  thus  far  narrower  than  the  prevailing  international  standard  and  thus
risks  association  with  the  exceedingly  narrow  definition  previously  developed  by  the  U.S.  De-
partment  of Justice.  See Michael  Isikoff et al.,  Torture's Path, NEWSWEEK,  Dec.  27,  2004,  at 54;
see also supra note 93 (discussing the Department of Justice memoranda).
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I4I).
9
5  Without  more  specificity,  it  is  impossible  to  know  what  he
really means.
A good opportunity to test Ignatieff's  ethical guides  against specific
recommendations  - and vice  versa  - comes  with the  recent publica-
tion  of a report on lawful  antiterrorism  strategies.96  The  report, issued
by  the  Long-Term  Legal  Strategy  Project,  emerged  from  a  year  of
study  by  a  team  of academics  and  former  government  officials  from
the  United States  and  Great Britain  and  was  funded  by the National
Memorial  Institute  for the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  and  the Office  for
Domestic  Preparedness  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  Homeland  Secur-
ityY  It  offers  specific  recommendations  for balancing  freedom and  se-
curity  in the  contexts  of coercive  interrogation,  detention,  data collec-
tion  and surveillance,  and  oversight and  review.98  The  report aims to
cabin  overreaction  by  the  executive  by  forcing  it to justify  its policies
and practices to the  other branches and, ultimately, to the public.99
Take coercive  interrogation  as an  example.  Acknowledging  the  un-
certain  legitimacy  of  specific  interrogation  techniques  under  interna-
tional  law,1 00  the  report calls  for  strict compliance  with existing statu-
95  He  also  would permit targeted  assassinations  under some  circumstances  (p.  133)  - a tactic
that, to  the disappointment  of several  observers, the  Israeli Supreme  Court has declined  to con-
sider.  See Orna Ben-Naftali  & Keren R. Michaeli,  "We  Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law":
A  Legal Analysis  of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36  CORNELL  INT'L  L.J.  233,  235
(2003).  Widely thought to be contrary to international  law, especially when  civilians  are involved,
see, e.g.,  id. at 291;  Marco  Sass6ii,  Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism",
22  LAW & INEQ.  195,  213 (2004),  targeted assassination  is receiving new, if controverted, justifica-
tion.  See DERSHOWITZ,  supra note  76,  at 183-84;  Wayne  N. Renke,  Why  Terrorism Works: Un-
derstanding the  Threat, Responding to the Challenge, 41  ALBERTA  L.  REV.  771,  790-791  (2003)
(book review); see also Patricia Zengel,  Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 134 MIL. L.
REV. 123  (199).
96  See  PRESERVING  SECURITY  AND  DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS, supra note 89.
97  See id.
98  Id. at  i.
99  See  id.  at 16-17.
100  This  uncertainty stems from the  level  of generality  in the legal  principles  and from  the dis-
tinction in  the  Torture  Convention  between  an  absolute ban  on  torture, see  Convention  Against
Torture, supra note 84,  art. 2(2),  S.  TREATY DOC.  No.  ioo-2o at  20,  1465  U.N.T.S.  at  114,  and  a
more  measured  duty  to  "undertake  to  prevent..,  other  acts  of  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading
treatment or  punishment  which  do  not amount  to  torture," see  id.,  art.  i6(i),  S.  TREATY  DOC.
No.  OO-2O  at  23,  1465  U.N.T.S.  at  116.  Contributing  to the  uncertainty  are  U.S.  reservations
accompanying  ratification  of the  Torture  Convention  that narrow  the  definition  of  torture  with
phrases such as "prolonged mental harm" and  "threat of imminent death," see Lue, supra note  89,
at  162  & n.44 (discussing statutes implementing  the  Convention),  and  tie "cruel,  inhuman  or de-
grading  treatment or  punishment" to  conduct prohibited  by  the  Fifth,  Eighth,  and  Fourteenth
Amendments  to  the  U.S.  Constitution,  see  supra note  85  and  accompanying  text.  Some  uncer-
tainty also stems from  the  fact that the  United  States has  signed but  not ratified  Protocol  I sup-
plementing  the  Geneva  Conventions,  Protocol Additional  to  the Geneva  Conventions  of  12  Au-
gust  1949,  and  Relating  to the  Protection  of Victims  of International  Armed  Conflicts,  adopted
June  8,  1977,  1125  U.N.T.S. 3, which  ensures that even individuals  who  are  not prisoners  of war
are protected  against interrogation  involving violence  or threats of violence to their life, health, or
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tory  and  treaty  prohibitions  on  torture. 1 0 1   Nonetheless,  the  report
identifies  a  range  of  interrogation  techniques  falling  between  those
forbidden  as  torture  and  those  that  comport  with  the  standard  for  a
voluntary  confession  under the  Due Process  Clauses  of the  U.S.  Con-
stitution. 1 02  This set  of  techniques  includes  coercive  tactics,  such  as
covering  a  detainee's  head  with  a  hood,  depriving  him  of  sleep,  re-
stricting  his  access  to  food  and water,  and exposing  him  to  excessive
noise, 1 0 3  all  of which  British  forces  have  used  against suspected  mem-
bers of the IRA. 104  The  European Court of Human  Rights condemned
these  techniques  as  inhuman  and  degrading  but  held  that  they  fell
short  of torture. 05  Israel's  Supreme  Court forbade  similar interroga-
tion practices but specifically distinguished  them from torture  and held
open  the  possibility  of  a  defense  of  necessity  for  interrogators  using
these  techniques.
1 0 6   The  Long-Term  Legal  Strategy  Project  report
recommends  that the Attorney  General  develop  specific  guidelines  for
the  authorization  of  such  coercive  interrogation  techniques;  these
guidelines  would  be  subject  both  to an  absolute  prohibition  on  meth-
ods  that "shock  the  conscience"'1 7  and  to oversight  at six-month inter-
physical  or  mental  well-being.  Lue,  supra note  89, at  159 n.3o.  Apparently,  President  Bush
sought to take  advantage of this  ambiguity by declaring detainees  held at  Guantdnamo  Bay "en-
emy combatants" rather than prisoners of war, although  some people  conclude  that the  same legal
standards apply to  both groups.  See In  re Guantanamo  Detainee  Cases, Nos.  o2-CV-o2 9 9  et  al.,
2005  U.S. Dist. LEXIS  1236, at  *1o5-14 (D.D.C. Jan. 31,  2005).
10,  See PRESERVING  SECURITY AND  DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS,  supra note  89, at 24.
102  See id.
103  Cf  Lue,  supra note  89,  at  174-75  (noting  uncertainty  about  the  constitutionality  of  such
techniques); see also infra note  107.
104  See Ireland v. United Kingdom,  25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41  (1978).
1O5  See id.  at 66-67.
106  See H.C.  5100/94, Pub. Comm.  Against Torture v. Israel, 53(4) PD. 817,  paras. 24-32,  avail-
able at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/terrorirmlaw.pdf  (English  translation
by Israeli  Supreme  Court); Lue, supra note 89,  at  161 & nn.  42-43.  Apparently, Israeli interroga-
tors ended up expansively  using physical  means, including shaking,  sleep deprivation,  and forced
crouching,  rather  than  reserving  them  for exceptional  cases.  See  id.  at  175.  As a result,  the Is-
raeli  Supreme  Court  forbade  use  of  such  techniques  unless  explicitly  authorized  by  the  parlia-
ment.  Pub. Comm. Against Torture, 53(4)  PD. at paras.  24-32.  The  Knesset, to date,  has supplied
no  such legislative  approval.  The Court also declined  to  establish ex  ante  authorization  for acts
that might be eligible  for a necessity defense after  the fact.  Id.  at paras. 32-38.
107  The  report  attributes  this standard  to  Article  16  of the  Convention  Against  Torture.  See
PRESERVING  SECURITY  AND  DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS,  supra note 89,  at 24.  Meanwhile,  the
U.S.  Supreme  Court is divided  on  the question  whether  the  use  of  coercive  interrogation  tactics
itself violates the Constitution.  Compare Chavez  v. Martinez,  538  U.S. 760,  774-76 (2003) (plural-
ity  opinion) (arguing  that allowing  a wounded  suspect  to believe  that he  must  respond  to  police
questioning  in order to receive  medical  treatment for the  gunshot to  his face  does not violate the
Constitution), and Lue, supra note 89, at 163-64  (discussing Chavez), with Chavez, 538 U.S.  at 797
(Kennedy, J.,  concurring  in part and dissenting in  part) (arguing that such treatment is equivalent
to torture).
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vals  by the  Senate  and House  Intelligence,  Judiciary, and Armed  Ser-
vices Committees.
1 0 8
This recommended  authorization  of potentially  coercive,  cruel,  and
inhumane  treatment  represents  a  striking  departure  from  the  stan-
dards applied  in the United  States to restrict domestic  police  practices.
No  doubt  for  that  reason  - and  with  the  aim  of  establishing  more
constraints  than  the  Bush  Administration  currently  acknowledges  -
the  Long-Term  Legal  Strategy  Project  recommends  extra  procedural
hurdles  to  limit  the  use  of coercive  interrogation  techniques.  The  re-
port  recommends,  for  example,  that  authorized  techniques  be  em-
ployed only  when there is  no reasonable  alternative  and when there is
a  written determination,  supported  by sworn affidavits  and  subject to
congressional  and  administrative  oversight,  that  there  is  probable
cause  to  believe  an  individual  possesses  significant  information  about
either a "specific  plan that threatens  U.S.  lives" or a  "group or organi-
zation  making  such  plans  whose  capacity  could  be  significantly  re-
duced  by  exploiting  the  information."'1 9  Exceptions  to  these  proce-
dures  would  be  permitted  only  with  explicit  written  approval  by  the
President and  a finding,  subject to  congressional  oversight  and review
within  a  reasonable  period,  of urgent  and  extraordinary  need. 1 10  No
information  obtained  through  highly  coercive  interrogations  could  be
used against the detained individual in any U.S.  trial, including a mili-
tary  one."'  And  individuals  subject  to  coercive  interrogations  con-
trary to  the  provisions  of these  recommendations  would  be entitled  to
civil damages from the United States.
1 1 2
These  recommendations  specifically  provide  for  legislative  and  ju-
dicial oversight, as  Ignatieff would require  (p.  24).  Relative  to current
practice,  they  impose  significantly  greater  requirements  of  advance
approval. 113   The  recommendations  try  to  remedy  current  practices
that  leave  selection  and  approval  of coercive  interrogation  tactics  to
108  See PRESERVING SECURITY  AND  DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS, supra  note  89,  at 24-25.
109  Id. at 25.
110  See  id.  at 25-26.
111  See id. at  26.
112  See  id.  These  remedial  qualifications  reveal  how  troubling  the  coercive techniques  are  in
the view  of the Project's authors.
113  Current  practice  lacks  both  accountability  and disclosure  to  the  public.  See Parry, supra
note 91,  at 261.  Although classified  and shielded  from public scrutiny, lists of methods  for "physi-
cally  and  psychologically  stressful"  interrogation  have  apparently  been  approved  for  use  at
Guantdnamo  Bay and in Iraq.  See Lue, supra note  89,  at  156 (citing Dana Priest & Joe Stephens,
Pentagon  Approved Tougher Interrogations,  WASH.  POST, May  9,  2004, at Ai; and James Risen  et
al., Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations,  N.Y. TIMES, May  13,  2004,  at Ai).
These  techniques  include  sensory  deprivation,  stressful  positions,  dietary  manipulation,  forced
changes in sleep,  isolated confinement, and use  of dogs.  Id. at  157.  Apparently, U.S.  interrogators
have  also  on  occasion threatened  to use  torture or  led prisoners  to  believe  that they  were  being
held captive by a country  that uses torture.  See id.
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junior  military  personnel  and  establish  no  mechanism  to  check  the
President  or to hold  him accountable. 1
14  This point implies  a criterion
to supplement  Ignatieff's:  real executive  accountability  with allocation
of authority to match.
Yet in  important  ways, the  recommendation  on coercive  interroga-
tion  fails  Ignatieff's  tests.  The  proposal  does  not rest  on  evidence  of
true  effectiveness,  as  measured  in  terms  that include  political  as  well
as  other  consequences,  over either  the  short term  or the  long  term.
115
Use  of coercive  interrogation  could  generate  sharp  disapproval  from
allies  and  do  serious  and  lasting  damage  to  the  nation's  reputation.
The  proposal  also falls  short of Ignatieff's  requirement  that  less  coer-
cive  measures  have been  tried without success (p.  24).  Instead, the  re-
port  indicates  that  its standard  includes  a similar  but weaker  require-
ment  that alternative  means  of  gathering  information  "would  not  be
likely to accomplish  the same  purpose.""
6
Once  described  in  detail,  does  the  procedure  for  approving  use  of
coercive  interrogation  adequately  safeguard  liberty  and dignity  - or
does it instead permit uses of government power that simply fall below
the  standards  that our  laws and morality should allow?  I believe  that
once  we  see  what coercive  interrogation  involves  - and  once  we  see
the shortcomings  of even careful procedural  restraints - we will  stand
firmly  against it."'  Whatever  you  come to think about this  assertion,
114  See  PRESERVING  SECURITY  AND  DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS, supra note  89,  at  28.
115  The  damage  to  the  nation's reputation  and  credibility, in  particular, does not  figure  in  the
proposal though it matters  vitally in Ignatieff's analysis.  Ignoring such political  and reputational
fallout  is imprudent.  Even  confining  effectiveness  to  generating  reliable  and  relevant  evidence,
the Project's proposal rests  on an insufficient  record.  Mr. Lue notes  both anecdotal  evidence  sup-
porting  the effectiveness  of coercive  interrogation  and  methodological  problems with  distinguish-
ing  those techniques  from  torture  and  with  assessing their  effectiveness.  See Lue, supra note 89,
at  167-68.  A complete  analysis would have to take into account psychological damage  to interro-
gators  and retaliation by those who support the victims, in addition to political  and moral fallout.
See id. at  170.
116  PRESERVING  SECURITY  AND DEMOCRATIC  FREEDOMS, supra note 89,  at 30-31.
117  In  my  own  view, permission  to  use cruel and  degrading treatment  of detainees  should  not
become  part  of our  law,  even if  it  is  treated  as  exceptional.  Prudential  reasons  matter  here  as
much  as principle; exceptions  have a way of seeping  into regular practices.  Cruel and degrading
treatment also  has no proven  track record of effectiveness.  Presidential  findings to justify its use
are  not likely to  include  more  than  conclusive  rationales.  Nor is it ever likely to  face genuine  or
timely  review.  Moreover,  interrogation  techniques  that exceed  usual  constitutional  practices are
bound to  offend any who  hear about them - including our allies.  Their use does not only betray
our ideals, it also invites  retaliation, undermines our reputation in the world, and exposes our own
people  to greater risks of similar treatment  should they be  detained elsewhere  in the world.  If we
give  advance  approval  - even  for  exceptional  use  - we  cannot disown  cruel,  abusive,  and  de-
grading  treatment  done  in  our name.  Moreover,  "mere"  coercion  may well  fail to  force  trained
terrorists  to talk.  Then what happens?  Interrogators will  be  tempted  to  move from  coercion  to
cruel,  inhuman, and degrading treatment, or even  torture.
Current  U.S. law  unfortunately seems insufficient  to prohibit cruel,  inhuman, or degrading
interrogation  and  detention.  The  Eighth  Amendment's  ban  on  cruel  and  unusual  punishment
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concrete  proposals  produce  new  and vital questions.  How much,  if at
all,  should  our  standards  change  because  of  terrible  circumstances?
Does  spelling  out  the  terms  for  permissible  use  of physically  or  men-
tally  painful  interrogation  techniques  effectively  condone  such  tech-
niques  beyond  the  specified  circumstances?  These  are  the  kinds  of
questions  that become  unavoidable  in  the  face of specific  measures,  as
spelled out in the Long-Term  Strategy report."18
IV.  SO WHAT IS THE GREATEST EVIL?
Michael Ignatieff makes  clear that simply adjusting the  law so that
extraordinary  governmental  powers  are  lawful  does  not  meet  his  re-
quirements.  Law  would  then  become  circular  rather than  a firm  line;
the rule  of law would shrink to a fig  leaf rather than  a tether to endur-
ing  values.  Ignatieff,  like  the  participants  in  the  Long-Term  Legal
Strategy  Project,  seeks  a  category  between  the  forbidden  and  the
clearly  permitted,  a  zone  of  acceptable  departures  from  settled  law.
may  not cover  preindictment, pretrial interrogations.  American  courts may permit a range  of co-
ercive  practices  against  suspected  terrorists  given  both  the  nationwide  fear  since  September  iI
and  the  flexible,  contextual  interpretation  of the relevant  constitutional  provisions.  See  T"'op v.
Dulles,  356 U.S.  86,  1oo-oi  (1958)  (holding the  Eighth  Amendment  to  be  interpreted  in  light  of
"evolving standards  of decency  that mark the  progress of a maturing  society"); Rochin  v. Califor-
nia,  342 U.S.  165,  172  (1952)  (advancing the "shocks the conscience"  test for  interpreting due proc-
ess  under the  Fourteenth  Amendment).  The  geographic scope  of  our  constitutional  protections
may  be  confined to our territory, prompting offshore  detentions  and interrogations  by U.S.  hands
and  the  rendition  of detainees  to  control  by  other  nations.  Indeed,  some  explicitly  argue  for  a
"foreign  interrogation"  exception  to  U.S.  constitutional  law.  See  M.K.B.  Darmer, Beyond  bin
Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law  in  an Age of Terrorism, 12  CORNELL J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y  319,
351-54  (2003).  Even  if U.S.  courts forbid  use  in  criminal  trials  of  statements  obtained  through
coercive  interrogation,  they may  stop  short of outlawing  such  interrogations  for  other  purposes.
See  Chavez  v.  Martinez,  538  U.S.  760,  767  (2003)  (plurality  opinon);  see also supra note  107.
Whether  forbidding  cruel,  inhuman,  or degrading  practices  requires  congressional  action  or  ap-
peals  to  international  law or  ethics,  the  legality  and  legitimacy  of  hooding  detainees,  depriving
them  of sleep,  restricting  their  access  to  food  and  water, or exposing  them  to  excessive  noise  or
cold seems to be  in the hands of the American  public.  Yet the  public is given little  information in
advance or even  after the fact and has no easy  way to become  informed or to take a stand.
118  An insuperable  challenge  in specifying the  tie between  means and ends  in this context is the
enormous  number  of imponderables:  Are  coercive  interrogation  tactics able  to  generate  reliable
information?  Are less  coercive tactics  also  able  to generate  reliable  information?  Even  if the  in-
formation  secured  is  known  to  be  reliable,  does  it  measurably  enhance  national security?  Will
knowledge  of either its reliability  or its  utility be  available  in any  time period relevant  to the op-
erative decisions?  Since  the candid answer to each of these questions  is most likely "we just don't
know,"  it  becomes  an  almost  empty  exercise  to  speculate  whether  alternative,  less  restrictive
means would  accomplish  the  same  purpose.  Both  the  effectiveness  of means  in  the  short  term
and  their  relationship  to  the  ultimate  end  of increased  security  are  fundamentally  unknown.
Nonetheless,  inquiry into the  fit between  means and  ends  should at least  restrain government ac-
tors from proceeding  without some effort to catch  hold of the uncertainties  and  connect proposed
actions to  reasons.  Given the  strong impetus  to  do  simply anything  in  the face  of terrifying  cir-
cumstances - and the sad,  documented  abuses  and  violence committed  in  the name  of security
and fighting terrorism - even this limited restraint is of vital importance.
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But  when  do  such  adjustments  in  the  law  bend  it  so  far  that  it
breaks? 119
Unfortunately,  law  alone  is  so  pliable  that  it  can  be  bent  beyond
recognition.  In recent  months  we  have  learned  that lawyers  working
- secretly  - at  the  highest  levels  of government  can  parse  words  so
well  as  to  pare  down  the  prohibition  against  torture  to  apply only  to
actions  producing  pain  comparable  to  that  caused  by  organ  failure,
impairment  of bodily  function,  or death. 120   Only  public  outcry  after
the leak of the "torture memos," the photographs  of grotesque abuse  of
prisoners at the hands of Americans,  and the President's nomination  of
a lawyer  directly  connected  to the  memos  to head  the  nation's Justice
Department  forced  the  Administration  to  replace  this  interpretation
with  something  more  closely  resembling  the  prevailing  domestic  and
international  standard.' 2'
Ignatieff's  goals  would  be  better  secured  by  rules  employing  pre-
sumptions than  by balancing tests with multiple factors  that invariably
leave  much  discretion.  For  example,  given  Ignatieff's  call  to  revisit
laws adopted  in emergencies,  a sunset clause  could be  required for any
emergency-time  law  that impinges  on civil  liberties.'22  Similarly, any
U.S.  law  imposing  a  greater  infringement  on  civil liberties  than  com-
parable  initiatives  in  other  leading  democracies  could  be  deemed  pre-
sumptively irrational absent specific  evidence  of the need for a tougher
law  here. 123  And  any domestic  law  that  violates  well-settled  interna-
tional  law  could  also  be identified  as presumptively  unjustified,  given
likely adverse political reactions by the international community. 24
Yet this proposal  to use presumptive  rules  is itself flawed.  Each  of
these  norms would  be highly controversial  and  difficult to  implement.
119  For an argument that it is  better to sever  law  adopted  in and  applicable  to the  emergency
context from the  mainstream corpus of the  law, see Gross, supra note  32.  This position  is similar
to  the view  that the  law should  not approve  torture  in  advance,  but can  excuse  it after the  fact
and thereby keep  it out of the  corpus of the law.  See supra note  lo6 and  accompanying  text (not-
ing the Israeli  Supreme  Court's rejection of coercive interrogation  but  preservation  of a potential
necessity defense  for those who have used it).
120  See  Douglas Jehl  &  David  Johnston,  White  House Fought New  Curbs on Interrogations,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,  2005, at Ai.
121  See  id.; Neil A.  Lewis,  U.S. Spells Out New Definition Curbing Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
1,  2005,  at  Ai; see  also MARK  DANNER,  TORTURE  AND  TRUTH:  AMERICA,  ABU  GHRAIB,
AND THE  WAR  ON  TERROR  (2004)  (primary  documents  and  reports  on  abuses  of  prisoners  in
Abu Ghraib);  TORTURE:  A COLLECTION  (Sanford Levinson ed.,  2004) (political,  legal, and ethi-
cal essays  on  the legitimacy  of torture);  THE  TORTURE  PAPERS,  supra note  83 (memoranda  by
Department  of Justice and  White House  Counsel);  What on Earth Were They  Thinking: Why  the
Debate on  Torture Will Not Go Away,  ECONOMIST, June  19,  2004,  at 31,  31-32  (discussing  the
Department of Justice memorandum).
122  Cf supra pp. 2140-41.
123  Cf supra pp. 2145-46 (discussing  THE LESSER EVIL, p.  24).
124  Cf supra pp.  2161-62  (discussing the  treatment of coercive,  cruel,  inhuman,  and  degrading
practices in other countries, and emerging international norms).
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Even  if these difficulties  abated,  the  form  and  the  specific  content  of
legal  norms  would never  fully  or sufficiently  guarantee  fidelity  to  our
fundamental  values  while also  affording  flexibility in response  to chal-
lenging circumstances.
Ignatieff - and the  rest of us  - need  more than  law to guide  us  if
we  consider  using  the lesser  evil  to combat  the greater  evil.  We  need
something  more  compelling  than  general  precommitments  to  dignity,
due process, effectiveness,  the idea of the last resort as the only time to
compromise  our  principles,  and  legislative  and  judicial  review.  Al-
though  Ignatieff's tests  are helpful,  even  he acknowledges  they are not
enough.  So what is?  At some  points, Ignatieff calls  for deference  to a
higher law  (p. 44).  In the end, though,  he places  his hope in the task of
persuasion  (pp.  169-7o).  First, we must try "to  ensure that each  of us
actually  believes  in  our  society  as  much  of  the  time  as  possible"  (p.
169).  That objective  requires us to work to realize  a vision of civil lib-
erties and equal dignity that has yet to be achieved; the spirit of people
believing  in that vision  is our best defense against  governmental  over-
reaching (pp.  167-69).125  Second,  we must work to persuade  even  the
nihilist  terrorist that  we respect  every  person's  dignity - even  his -
but also that we  will defend ourselves (pp.  69-70).
Hanging  all hopes on social persuasion  may at first seem  a cop-out.
Rather  than defending  a robust  vision  of civil  liberties  and  equal dig-
nity  against  which  to  measure  antiterrorist  tactics, Ignatieff turns  the
matter over  to  public debate.  He instructs us  to  deposit our hopes  in
the commitment to persuade, and then to abide by the judgment of the
democratic  community over time.  This conclusion,  in my  opinion, ac-
tually is courageous,  invigorating, and honest.  There  could be no more
vivid commitment to liberal  democracy than this view of persuasion as
both  inevitable  and  desirable.  Here,  Ignatieff  rejects  claims  of neces-
sity, expertise,  or  other authority to  sustain  his  conclusions.  Even  the
force of law in a democracy  depends on whether  its content and direc-
tion persuade  us to be who we want  to be.  The hope  that reason  can
persuade  becomes  both aspiration  and guide  during this  dark time  -
and provides  the conclusion  for this sober, realistic book.
Such hope hinges on obtaining for public review at some  reasonable
point  in  time  key  information  about  steps  the  government  has  pro-
125  Philip Heymann reaches  a compatible conclusion:  "[Olur pride  in being Americans  is as  im-
portant to maintain as our skyscrapers,  and ...  therefore political and moral stakes,  and the cour-
age of citizens, are  as important as greater  personal security."  HEYMANN, supra note  3o, at  179.
Alongside our pride  and our spirit, our laws may also  be crucial.  See Emanuel  Gross, The  Strug-
gle of a  Democracy Against Terrorism - Protection  of Human Rights: The  Right to Privacy Ver-
sus  the National Interest - The Proper Balance, 37  CORNELL  INT'L  L.J. 27,  28  (2004)  ("The
moral weapon  is no less  important  than any other  weapon, and perhaps  even surpasses  it - and
there is no more effective  moral weapon than  the rule of law."  (quoting H.C. 320/8o,  Kawasma v.
Minister of Defense, 35(3)  P.D.  113,  132) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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posed and  taken  in  response  to  terror.126  Before  and  after  periods  of
crisis - if not immediately  in the midst of them - the public  needs  to
know  precisely  when  courts  and agencies  authorize  invasions  of indi-
vidual liberty  in pursuit of  security.  Then,  the  people  require  the  op-
portunity  to question  those  decisions.  Only with  such knowledge  and
opportunity for debate  can people  be persuaded  rather than compelled
or left in the dark. 127  The government lawyers'  crabbed  definitions  of
torture might  not survive the  public's  test, for example,  but long-term
detentions  - complete  with  genuine  opportunities  for  adversarial  re-
view, access  to defense  counsel,  and enforceable conditions  of dignified
confinement  - just might.  Or, once  made  visible,  even  such  deten-
tions  might remind  us  of abusive  regimes  against  which  we  do  and
must define  ourselves.  The question  must be not what a  government
will  get away  with,  but what  will  inspire  the governed  to defend  and
renew their - our - society.
Honestly  confronting  the  tragic  choices  before  us, Ignatieff  tells  us
to  consider  using  lesser  evils  that  violate  legal  principles  to  fight the
greater  evils  of  terrorism.  Yet  along  the  way, he  builds  an  eloquent
case  that  the  greatest  evil  is  to  cast  away  our  hopes  for  a  world  in
which  we  each  give  and  receive  the  human  respect  that  treats  us  as
persuadable.  This profoundly challenges  the  use of any measures  that
jeopardize  the dignity of any human being more than is absolutely nec-
essary  and clearly  the  last resort.  Ongoing  assessments  of these meas-
ures must then involve the entire  community, not just experts, not just
judges on  a secret court, and not just application  of rules written  down
in advance.
It  is tempting  to locate compulsion  or coercion  in law - or even  to
conceive  of law  as  a  sturdy precommitment,  the  mast  to which  we tie
ourselves  in  anticipation  of temptations  to depart.  Yet it is the future
that should tug at us.  Hope  and fear about the future must strengthen
us  to  resist  giving  up  what  we  care  about.  Law  should  frame  our
practices  in this light and make  sure  power  is not used  in our name  to
undermine  our future.  We  can  learn much  from others  - the British,
the  Israelis  - who  have  long  struggled  to  defend  themselves  and  to
126  See supra notes 74,  76-77  (discussing the value  of public  review).  Relying  on the  possibility
that community  members  can  be  persuaded  requires  not only that we deposit trust  in  their judg-
ment, but  also that  we do  what is  necessary to ensure  that the community  is informed,  engaged,
and capable  of exercising judgment.  People may need practice  in the work  of persuasion,  the  as-
sessment of relevant information,  and  their role as judges of public policy if reliance  on their per-
suadability is to check and  validate governmental  steps that are "lesser  evils."
127  Thus, in camera judicial  review may  be essential to protect  security and intelligence  gather-
ing,  but public disclosure  of the  fact of such  review  - and opportunities  to  learn about whether
and how it works - are necessary to persuade  members of a democratic  society that such exercise
of official power is legitimate.
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maintain  commitment to human  dignity in the face  of terror.  28  Look-
ing  back  on  the  violence  and  war  she  managed,  former  Israeli  Prime
Minister  Golda  Meir concluded,  "We  can  forgive  the  Arabs  for killing
our sons, but not for making our sons killers.' 29  As  vividly as we can,
we must imagine our alternate destinies and fight to ensure that we do
not become  what we hate.
1 30
128  See supra p.  2146  (referring to  British  experience);  supra p.  2162  (referring  to British  and
Israeli experiences).
129  THE  ORTHODOX  UNION,  GREAT  LEADERS  OF  OUR  PEOPLE:  GOLDA  MEIER,  at
http://www.ou.org/about/judaism/rabbis/meier.htm  (last visited Apr. 10,  205).
130  Resisting  that fate  means fighting people  who know that our greatest danger  is slipping into
becoming what we hate.  As Mark Danner says of the Iraqi insurgents:
[T]hey cannot defeat the  Americans  militarily but they  can  defeat  them politically.  For
the  insurgents, the  path to  such  victory lies  in provoking  the American  occupiers  to  do
their  political  work  for  them  ....  The  insurgents  want  to  place  the  outnumbered,
overworked  American troops  under constant fear  and  stress so they  will mistreat Iraqis
on a broad scale  and succeed in making themselves  hated.
Mark  Danner,  Torture  and  Truth,  N.Y.  REV.  BOOKS,  June  io,  2004,  at  46,  47  (reviewing
ANTONIO  M.  TAGUBA,  ARTICLE  15-6  INVESTIGATION  OF THE  800TH  MILITARY  POLICE
BRIGADE  (2004);  and  DELEGATES OF  THE INT'L COMM.  OF THE  RED CROSS,  REPORT  OF
THE  INTERNATIONAL  COMMITTEE  OF THE RED  CROSS (ICRC) ON THE  TREATMENT  BY
THE  COALITION  FORCES  OF PRISONERS  OF WAR  AND  OTHER PROTECTED  PERSONS  BY
THE  GENEVA  CONVENTIONS  IN  IRAQ  DURING  ARREST,  INTERNMENT  AND
INTERROGATION  (2004)).
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